

A
POLITICAL AND MILITARY
R H A P S O D Y,
ON THE
INVASION AND DEFENCE
O F
GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND.

ILLUSTRATED WITH THREE COPPER-PLATES.

BY THE LATE
GENERAL LLOYD. R

TO WHICH IS ANNEXED,
A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE AUTHOR,
AND A
SUPPLEMENT BY THE EDITOR.

PRO ARIS ET FOCIS.

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POLITICAL AND MILITARY

R H A P 2 6 7

INVASION AND DEFENCE

OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND

ILLUSTRATED BY THREE COLOURED PLATES

BY THE AUTHOR

GENERAL A. D. N. S.

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VI. AHC

INTRODUCTION.

A PAMPHLET on the present armaments, and on the *Invasion of Great Britain*, was lately published in Paris, that is, in 1790, by a Mr. Dupont, some time since President of their National Assembly, and considered there as a patriotic writer and orator. In this conceited production, after accusing Great Britain of a variety of crimes, of her dreading, and wishing to overturn the new constitution of France, he exhorts, with national zeal and acrimony, his countrymen to support, and to strengthen the Family Compact: he boasts that France, Spain, and the United States of North America, whom he is pleased to enumerate with his allies, are an overmatch at sea for Great Britain and Holland. He anticipates the triumphs that would follow a national war, and lays it down as a preliminary

a

liminary that peace should not afterwards be restored, until the Bank of England shall have become bankrupt, and all her naval arsenals shall be destroyed. He talks not a little vauntingly and superciliously of the exhausted credit and finances of Great Britain, and of the comparative superiority of riches in France, by means of the recent sequestered revenues of the clergy. And he proposes schemes for the ruin of the British commerce, and the crippling of the British navy.

Here follows, “*verbatim*” a specimen of Mr. Dupont’s stile and modesty.

“ If the war be *short*, it shall be in the
 “ heart of your own country, and with
 “ all the impetuosity of the French na-
 “ tion. If it be *long*, the conquest shall
 “ be obtained by the last *Crown*. What
 “ is to prevent the inspection of the
 “ English *Bank*, by our national Gren-
 “ diers? Great Britain has yet no idea
 “ of a *national* war with France, of its
 “ activity, its obstinacy, its ferocity, and
 “ of

“ of the irresistible energy of the veteran
 “ warriors, and of the new warriors of
 “ France. We say not this *boastingly* ;
 “ we ought to conquer you, as we are
 “ superior in number, and treasure. As
 “ soon as we have got together a suf-
 “ ficient force to protect our passage, *we*
 “ *will come over among you.* News from
 “ America, or from India, is naturally
 “ long coming. We are, however, cer-
 “ tain, that the power will be *theirs*,
 “ who shall be masters in Europe. If
 “ now you refuse peace to us, and our
 “ allies, upon our *honour*, we will come
 “ to seek for it in *London*, and there we
 “ shall *assuredly find it.* Reply quickly,
 “ for the disarming must commence
 “ within a *week*, or hostilities in a
 “ *month.*”

“ *Risum teneatis Britanni & Hiberni.*”

There are French writers on every art
 and science who are an ornament to their
 country, and to human nature, but in
 a 2 that

respectable list I cannot class Mr. Dupont, and far less should I compare him to heroic names of antiquity. He is neither an Agamemnon, an Ulysses, nor a Nestor; but in argument, and not improbably in heroism, bears a nearer resemblance to Therfites. I take notice of him merely because I know that multitudes of his countrymen are inflated with similar ideas of their power and prowess. Indeed, diffidence is not a characteristic feature of our neighbours. Whenever the brazen throat of war shall summon Britain to arms, we may expect to have our ears stunned with invasion : our enemies without, and their emissaries within, will ring the changes on these imaginary perils ; and probably, without any substantial hopes of conquest, they may flatter themselves of being able to confine us to mere defensive operations, to intimidate, and disconcert the nation, and to injure public confidence and credit. For these reasons, I shall take a more comprehensive view, and enter into a
more

more minute discussion of this subject, than has yet been attempted. Such discussion will at least administer some consolation to the inexperienced, and to those of weak fibre. It will from thence be obvious, that unless the nation and its governors are destitute of judgment, patriotism, and courage, we may be invulnerable at home, and that we should rather solicit than dread the execution of these impotent threats.

The following celebrated Essay will enable the reader to form some critical judgment on this interesting topic. The Author, General Lloyd, had before eminently distinguished himself, as a writer, and a General, in his renowned *Military History of the last seven years wars in Germany*, two volumes of which in Quarto, with Plates, were published by the General; and lately a third volume, from the Generals manuscripts, by Lord Fielding. His treatise on the invasion,

and defence of England, was printed in London, in 1779, during the latter part of the unfortunate American war, at the critical period when the fleets of France and Spain, rode triumphant in the Channel; when our veteran regiments were mouldering across the Atlantic, and invasion, invasion, was thundered at our gates.

A very few copies of this publication had been distributed by the Author amongst his military friends, when lucrative overtures were made to him to suppress it, and to part with the whole impression. Perhaps it might have then given rise to a public and parliamentary scrutiny, and might alarm those to whom the safety and defence of the nation was intrusted. But I think it will be manifest, that France was infinitely more interested than Great Britain in its suppression: because it unfolded secret stratagems and plans of her cabinet, in maturing of which she had expended

expended large sums. It will appear, from the following history of this able Engineer, General, and Author, that all the alledged fears of communicating, through this publication, improper information to the enemy, were absurd phantoms; that in 1744, and 1754, France had this identical plan of invasion chalked out to her by General Lloyd, who was then engaged in the service of that nation, and of the Pretender.

It was just 39 years after the first sketch of this plan of invasion, that the present Rhapsody on the enemy's objects, and the means of defeating such attempts was digested and printed; and after the author had been engaged in a variety of hot service, as a general officer, in the Russian and Imperial armies. From this we may conclude that the subject had been arranged, corrected, and matured with all the military perspicuity and judgment with which General L——d was so conspicuously endowed.

This treatise reflects more light on a late litigated and important topick, the propriety of the fortification system, and security of the marine arsenals on the channel coast, than all the rhetoric and wrangling of our senate. And as that system still continues to be reprobated by numbers, the public, and the parliament, if they chuse, may derive from hence much useful information. The fort now constructing at Gosport, is evidently from a hint of General Lloyd's. Without the critical talents of an engineer, one might almost, *a priori*, infer, that where nature has left us weak or exposed in any political vital part, that there art should be substituted. In our own formation we may draw this principle and instruction from the Divine Architect.

The Editor of this unrivalled Treatise considers himself as conferring an essential favour on the nation, by snatching it from obscurity, and restoring it to its merited rank and notice. Are those to be considered

dered as the public's friend or foe, who point out to them their vulnerable and crazy parts, or those who would lull them into fatal apathy and security. Ever since the suppression of this publication, a printed or manuscript copy of it has been sought after, with extraordinary avidity, by the first military and political characters, and was considered as a valuable acquisition. The Editor knows Booksellers who have been repeatedly offered ten guineas for a single copy: and, some years ago, at the sale of General Lloyd's effects, after his decease, a manuscript copy, without the plates, was purchased for a British Minister of State, at the price of one hundred guineas.

The following short account of General Lloyd is communicated by Mr. Drummond, a gentleman descended from an ancient and noble family in Scotland, whose ancestors were ruined by their unfortunate attachment to the exiled house
of

of Stewart; a gentleman who has since atoned for the mistaken zeal of his family, and for his own juvenile and unavoidable connections, by rendering eminent political services to Great Britain, and who is now about suing for the titles and estates of the Earldom of Perth.

N. B. Mr. D. was born in France,

MR.

MR. DRUMMOND'S LETTER

TO THE

EDITOR.

MY First knowledge of General Lloyd was in France, in 1744. He was then, as I understood, a Lay Brother in some religious house. Mr. Gordon, my tutor, recommended him to my father as a proper person to teach me Geography and Field Engineering, in which line Mr. Lloyd had given specimens of superior talents to some Scotch and Irish officers in the French service. He appeared to be between 20 and 30 years of age, was a Welchman by birth, and said to be of a respectable family; he had received a liberal education, and although designed for the church, he said he had been some time with a Lawyer, before he went to France. His aim then was the army,
but

but having no friend to procure him a commission, he was persuaded by some British priests to take the habit of a Noviciate or Monk. Nevertheless his genius still continued for the military line, and he was engaged to attend my elder brother and myself, who joined the French army under Marshal Saxe in 1745. Mr. L. was with us at the battle of Fontenoy, which I believe was the first actual service he ever saw. My station on that day being a Cadet in the corps of Engineers, as well as a Lieutenant in Lord John Drummond's regiment of royal Scotch, Monsi. de Rochauard, the chief engineer, (under whom I acted) saw an acuteness in Mr. Lloyd's manner of drawing and making sketches of the ground about the villages of Fontenoy (which was a part of my duty to examine and plan) that he got an order from Marshal Saxe to allow Mr. L. to wear our corps uniform, and to attend me on horseback as an assistant draughtsman, with the pay of a sub-ensign.

When

When the expedition to Scotland was set on foot, Mr. Lloyd was appointed *third Engineer*, with the rank of Captain, by a commission from the Pretender. He then went to Nantz, and was with me on board the *Elizabeth* in the action with the *Lion*, Capt. Sir Piercy Brett, in the Channel; he behaved gallantly, was wounded in the right shoulder, and after the fight we went out of the *Elizabeth* on board a brig, which carried us after the young Chevalier to Scotland, where we attended him till that Prince arrived at Carlisle. Mr. L. was dispatched from thence with letters to our friends in Wales; he did not join us again, but went into South Wales, where he re-assumed the character of a Priest, and became a spy to look round the coasts of Wales and of the Channel, for an expected French fleet. In this tour he examined all the coasts from Milford Haven round the Bristol Channel, to Bridgewater and Barnstaple Bay; continuing his survey from thence to Plymouth and
Dover,

Dover, and from the Downs to Margate and London. No man ever was more correct with his eye; he saw at once the advantages and disadvantages of ground, and his remarks were made with so much penetration and judgment, that all his observations were to be depended upon. At length, by some accident, he became suspected, and was taken up in London by a General Warrant. When I came to London a prisoner of war in the winter of 1746, after the battle of Culloden, I found my friend Lloyd at Carington's, the messenger, in Jermyn-street, where I, with some of my brother officers, were lodged for safety. I rejoiced to see him, but it was not known that he had been with us in Scotland, otherwise he must have been tried as a rebel, and have suffered as such; his mission, knowledge, and great abilities having made him a considerable object and character of that time,

In 1747 I got him relieved by means of my relation, a noble Duke, and I then employed him under the denomination of a tutor, seeming never to have known him before. In the same year he went with me to France, and followed me to the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom, where he became in high esteem with Marshall Lovendhall: during that siege he obtained the rank of *Major*, and was of infinite service in mounting batteries, in choosing ground and exploring mines, as well as in opening sluices. When I went to Spain in 1748, my father recommended Major Lloyd to the Earl Marshal, who was at that time in great reputation with the King of Prussia; this nobleman recommended Lloyd to his brother, Marshal Keith, and when I returned from my Spanish voyage and survey of the coast of Terra Firma in 1754, I met with him in Paris. At which time there being a plan laid for an invasion of England, Lloyd was recommended to the Marshal duc de Bellisle, then Minister of war, who

who had also appointed me to come to England as Commissary General to superintend all the French prisoners, taken before the formal declaration of war in 1756. Lloyd's former knowledge of the British coast, the exactness of his descriptions, and his genius as a spy, afforded him great advantages on this occasion; in consequence of which he resigned his Prussian rank, accepted a new Field Officers commission in the French service, with an appointment of five louis *per diem*, to re-survey the British coast, and to report thereon to the Duc de Bellisle. He accordingly came to England in 1756, re-assumed the habit *Bourgeoise*, and having nothing of a military look, he went where he pleased, as a trader or rider. Thus he re-examined the British coast, and laid the foundation of his much esteemed Treatise upon the natural strength of Britain; pointing out all that could be done by invasion, and all that might be done by defence. His report, however, made the French Ministry change their
inten-

intentions of invading Britain, and the Marechal Duc de Richlieu was better pleased at being sent to Minorca, than to attempt a landing at Torbay.

Lloyd then quitted England and went to Germany, where he was employed some years in the Russian and Austrian service, and promoted to higher rank. From my remaining in Great Britain after 1756, and quitting the army, as well as going to the West Indies in 1758, I lost my friend 'till about 1776, when I again met with him in London under the title of General Lloyd; he then told me that he had made his peace here, and afterwards informed me that he had obtained a pension upon the Chelsea establishment.

JOHN DRUMMOND.

*London, Fermyn-Street,
Nov. 5, 1790.*

b P A R T

P A R T II.

CONSISTS of Extracts from General Lloyd's Military History, respecting the various modes of invasion and defence of all the European nations. From this I have selected those parts only, which refer to Great Britain and France. The Reader will readily perceive, that these additions tend essentially to the elucidation of the interesting topicks now under discussion; to collect into a focus all General L——d's opinions and reflections on this subject; and to increase the value of the Rhapsody, as he was pleased to term it.

PART III. OR SUPPLEMENT,

Is from the Editor's own stores. It appeared to him indispensable, and equally in illustration of the main object, and
outline

outline of the present Treatise. It exhibits Great Britain from infancy to manhood, struggling, throughout a series of eighteen centuries, against foreign and domestic assaults, and in her turn retaliating upon her aggressors and rivals. At the same time, it supplies a portion of what G——l L——d, in his Rhapsody, had recommended and left unfinished, An Estimate of the relative and absolute Force of Great Britain and France.

A RHAP.

A
R H A P S O D Y
O N
FRENCH POLITICS, &c.

IT is impossible to calculate, with any degree of probability, the duration and event of a war, unless we are acquainted with the political system, principles of government, and resources of the contending powers. I shall, therefore, give a short view of them, which will enable the Reader to form some judgment of the present state of affairs.

C H A P. I.

*A general view of the Politics of France
during the two last Centuries.*

WHILE the House of Austria was all-powerful in Europe, and possessed of many provinces on the west side of the Rhine, now united to France, it was evident that the French nation could have no other permanent system of politics, but that which tended to reduce that House within narrower bounds, particularly in the Low Countries, and towards the Rhine. Accordingly, we find France continually employed in raising disturbances in Germany, Italy, Spain, &c. and exciting the different powers of Europe and Turkey against Austria. Richelieu having reduced the Hugonots, took an active part at the latter end of the war, which had been maintained in Germany for near thirty years ;

and by the treaty of Westphalia, the French, as one of the guarantees, obtained a right to interfere in the affairs of Germany, of which they have availed themselves on every occasion to embarrass the House of Austria. More than once, they brought her to the brink of destruction, and had it not been for the powerful support and assistance of the maritime powers, particularly of England, she must have fallen a victim to the ambition of France. Those powers who feared Austria, very naturally looked up to France for protection, and increased her strength by the addition of their forces.

During the minority of Lewis XIV. the administration of Mazarine was almost totally confined to domestic occurrences, which were sufficiently embarrassing to occupy his whole attention.

Lewis XIV. on taking the reins of government, pursued the system of his

predecessors with regard to Austria. Having, in the beginning of his reign, met with great success in war, and added some provinces to his crown, he became ambitious, from that principle, rather than from necessity, (for he was already sufficiently powerful to have nothing to fear from Austria) Lewis did not cease to embroil Europe, almost during his whole reign. In the course of his wars, he found himself checked, chiefly by the maritime powers; England was out of his reach; without ships of war nothing could be done against her. Seconded by able ministers, in a few years, to the astonishment of all the world, he raised a powerful fleet, and, for a little time, maintained a superiority at sea, of which he availed himself in an attempt to reinstate James II. on the throne of England, but without success. The confederacy formed against the French monarch on the continent became so powerful, particularly towards the close of his reign, that the whole
force

force of his kingdom was scarce sufficient to resist the progress of the allied armies. The marine was of course abandoned, and sunk nearly into the insignificant state in which he found it. Soon after Lewis XV. had mounted the French throne, Cardinal Fleury became prime minister ; happily for France, who wanted peace to recover from the innumerable losses which the ambition of Lewis XIV. had brought upon her. This prelate, from principle, as well as temper, pursued invariably a pacific system ; the wars excited by the turbulent spirit of Alberoni for the kingdom of Naples, and that on the *Rhine*, occasioned by the *pretensions* of Augustus II. to the throne of Poland, were transitory, and of very short duration. The House of Austria having imprudently engaged in that quarrel, Fleury availed himself of her distressful situation, to tear Lorraine from her, which connected and compleated the French frontier on the German side.

On

On the death of Charles VI. a new and general war broke out in Germany, wherein the maritime powers engaged also. Cardinal Fleury wished to keep France neuter, believing either that Austria would find sufficient employment from the several Princes who formed pretensions to the Emperor's succession; and that by remaining neuter, the French might mediate and dictate the terms of peace, without partaking of the dangers and expences of the war: Or, perhaps, judging that France, recovered from her losses, and strengthened by her new acquisitions, would always be a match for Austria hereafter, whatever might be the event of a war. The cardinal, however, was over-ruled, and a general confederacy was formed against the House of Austria, which tended to annihilate her entirely: Indeed the success did not answer the hopes and expectations of the confederates, and things remained in great part, as they were at the commencement of the war. The King
of

of Prussia acquired Silesia, the King of Sardinia increased his possessions in Lombardy, and a settlement was procured for Don Philip, in the same country. The French and Spanish trade suffered greatly in the course of this war; for the expences of the land armies in Germany and Italy were so excessive, that no effort could be made by these two powers to establish a marine. Our trade and navigation increased, and furnished the means to pursue the war on the continent. France in the mean time excited disturbances in Scotland, which soon were quelled; because, for want of a marine, she could not support them, had she really meant to do it.

The last war offers us a new system of politics adopted by the French, contrary and opposite to that which they had for many ages prosecuted. The House of Austria being no longer an object of fear or jealousy, they engaged in
a con-

a confederacy, calculated for her aggrandizement, at the expence of a Prince whose alliance they had heretofore, and ought always to have courted. However formidable they might believe France to be, Austria had likewise increased in wealth, power, and, above all, her administration, in regard to finances, &c. was much improved. It seemed, therefore, highly advantageous for the French that there should be Princes in Germany, able, in some degree, to check the power of Austria. Prussia was, of all others, the most proper to be opposed to her, as they had done it with success during the preceding war. There is no explaining a system so very contrary to the apparent interests of France, unless we suppose that court had an after-game to play, as circumstances might offer, during the course of the hostilities.

The French originally engaged to furnish only twenty-four thousand men,
avowedly

avowedly to deliver Saxony ; and, if that had been effected, 'tis probable they would have forced the contending parties to conclude such a peace as they approved of. They had a numerous army to enforce their mediation. I cannot think they intended seriously to promote in the least the greatness of their ancient rivals in power, and much less at the expence of Prussia, whom they will find a powerful and necessary ally, in case of any future war with the former. The negotiations at Teschen last year, and the part they acted there, evince that they are not real friends to the House of Austria.

By engaging partially in the war in Germany, it is probable the French thought they might direct their principal attention to their marine, and to the defence of their colonies. All their schemes were defeated by the extraordinary efforts of the King of Prussia, and the allied army. Their new-raised
fleet

fleet being beat and dispersed, our superiority at sea enabled us to overcome every obstacle ; we conquered all we attacked, and reduced the House of Bourbon so low, that we might have prescribed any terms of peace. Unhappily we mistook entirely in the choice of our acquisitions, some of which, so far from being advantageous, have been one of the principal causes that brought the present calamities upon us. We attend too much to the contracted, and very often selfish, views of the merchants ; we act upon too narrow a scale, like traders, and seldom as a powerful nation. In forming treaties, a Minister should have the whole globe before his eyes, and by no means confine himself to this or that province, or branch of trade ; these are not to be overlooked, but they must never serve as a foundation for a treaty, unless you mean to reduce the nation to a company of mercantile people. Towards the end of the

the war the Duke of Choiseul became all-powerful in the French Ministry. He is a man of a bold, extensive, and enterprising genius. His country found in him the vastness of Richelieu, the activity of Louvois, the magnificence of Seignelay, the amiableness of Pomponne and they dismissed him. He projected and concluded the Family Compact, which unites the different branches of the House of Bourbon in the closest connection, and we now see the effects of that master-piece of politics.

The great losses that the French suffered during the last war, the imminent danger with which the taking of the Havannah, in particular, threatened the rest of the Spanish dominions in America, very naturally drew the whole attention of both nations to us. It was obvious that while we were superior at sea, notwithstanding the disproportion of our land forces, in any
future

future contest, their Colonies would always be exposed to the same danger, and if lost, might not always be restored at a peace. They have therefore attended to their marine alone; and have pursued this measure with such industry and activity, that a fleet has been raised by them which astonishes Europe, and must be very alarming to England. It is impossible to foresee how far success may correspond with their force or their ambition. Their views are great, and tend to reduce us within very narrow limits. That nothing should divert them from their main object, the French have, with the utmost care, avoided and prevented a German war, which might have engaged a part of their forces, and frustrated the general design against our country.

The present state of affairs enables us to resolve a political problem, often discussed

cuffed within and without doors, *viz.* Whether continental connections are useful or otherwise to this nation? I need not recapitulate the arguments for and against them; suffice it to say, that while we paid allies on the continent, the attention of France was so intirely taken up in the different wars in Germany, that she could not raise a marine in any degree proportioned to ours; that we have constantly maintained a decisive superiority at sea, which increased the power, glory, and political influence of the nation, notwithstanding the immense sums which were sent abroad for such connections; that since we have abandoned the continental system, France has acquired an unlimited influence in the different courts of Europe; without anxiety on that side, she has been enabled to direct the whole force of the House of Bourbon against England alone, and God knows what may be the issue of this, I fear, unequal

D

contest.

contest. Let us draw a veil over such an alarming prospect : Let every man exert himself to the utmost of his power for the service of his King and Country, that we may avert the storm which hangs over our heads, and baffle the efforts of our combined enemies,

Whoever considers the position of England, and of its Colonies, will perceive that our very existence depends on this circumstance alone, *viz.* that we should be superior at sea ; all our politics ought therefore to be directed to that object singly. Had we millions of armed men, equal in discipline to the Prussians, they can be of no use to defend our trade or Colonies ; and if we are reduced to defend England, all is over. Why has our fleet been neglected ? Why have the national funds been consumed and exhausted to multiply land forces, instead of being applied to raise a powerful fleet, which is the only force that can protect

protect us? It is impossible to explain this by any principle of reason; our militia alone are more than sufficient to repel any invaders, if our fleet be superior to theirs; and even the idea of an invasion in that case is absurd. Standing armies appear an useless burthen; and now, to our cost, they will be found totally inadequate to the defence of England and its Colonies.

Having abandoned continental connections, it became more than ever necessary to apply all our resources to the fleet. The question is by no means, whether it be equal or superior to what it was at any other period? I ask, why it is not superior to the fleet of the House of Bourbon? Does it arise from want of funds or men? Why do we not appropriate the sums employed in levying numberless corps, to build ships and raise twenty or thirty thousand marines? Why are not the new levies converted into

marines ? With proper encouragement this may be done, and unless it is done, we sink under the superior forces of the enemies.

Land forces are nothing. Marines are the only species of troops proper for this nation ; they alone can defend and protect it effectually. During the peace they garrison all your ports in each quarter of the globe ; in time of war your fleet is instantly manned ; and by employing many of them, fewer seamen are wanted in proportion. Besides, a fleet having on board twelve or fifteen thousand marines, is equal to almost any enterprize against the enemy's settlements, and keeps them in continual anxiety in every part of the world. By this means the expence and delays attending the embarkation of a considerable body of land forces, destined to attack the enemy, would be spared, and the success become more certain. Every
other

other method to prevent the final ruin of this country will be hurtful or ineffectual. *A powerful fleet and thirty thousand marines, I repeat it, will save us from destruction, and nothing else.*

C H A P. II.

*Of the Force of Nations, particularly of
France, Spain, and Great Britain.*

NO Author, that I know of, has given any data which can enable us to calculate the force of nations; it is therefore with diffidence that I propose my ideas on the subject. I think that the power and strength of a nation depend on the number of its inhabitants and the quantity of their industry. This can be found and estimated only by the yearly revenues raised on the subject, which bear a given proportion to the yearly production of the whole nation. It is the revenue which enables the Sovereign to maintain fleets and armies. It is the number of inhabitants which furnishes men for the one and the other; and in these I place the absolute force of a nation; for its relative force will depend on position,

tion, quantity of industry, strength of contiguous powers, military system, nature of the government, &c. which vary often in the course of a few years. It is therefore necessary we should attend only to the absolute force of nations, when we compare them with each other, in order to form a general scale, by which we measure their strength.

France contains above twenty millions of inhabitants: the yearly revenues of that kingdom amount to above sixteen millions sterling, five of which being appropriated to pay the interest of the national debt, eleven only will remain free, and according to our system, the absolute force of the French nation will be thirty-one.

Spain contains more than seven millions and a half of inhabitants in Europe, and above two in America, with a yearly revenue of above five millions;

so that her absolute force will amount to about fifteen. Consequently the absolute force of the House of Bourbon will be found equal to forty-six.

To this sum may be added that of our Revolted Colonies, which increases still the force united against us.

I wish that others, better informed than I am, would calculate the force of my own country upon this principle, and compare it with that of the House of Bourbon: though the contrast might appear very unfavourable to England, I do not doubt but her relative force, compared also with that of her enemies, would make amends for the enormous disproportion in point of inhabitants and revenues.

C H A P. III.

Of the Analogy between the Form of Government and the State of War.

DESPOTISM acts with the rapidity of a torrent ; like it it leaves desolation and solitude behind, or it declines into a lethargy. In despotism there is no system ; its motions are instantaneous, and arise from trifles, or the caprice of the moment. They are extremely violent, but transitory. If you can resist, or more safely avoid, their first impetuosity, you will easily conquer in the end.

Monarchy, though not so violent and rapid in its motions, is sufficiently strong to collect and exert the national forces. When endowed with wisdom, it directs them, so that they procure the most general and permanent advantages. It

is like a majestic river, which, if kept within bounds, and its waters judiciously distributed, embellishes and enriches the country. But when Administration is too violent, this beneficent river becomes a torrent, and ruins the country: if weak, it branches out into a thousand small rivulets, which finally dwindle to nothing.

As in monarchies the whole power of the state is centered in one man, and the exercise of it depends upon his will alone, to prevent a sudden and capricious use of it, which in a short time might ruin the state, it ought to be a maxim established in this kind of government, that the administration should be confined to many people, that the departments should be separated, and that the council of state should be numerous, because the government of one man being naturally quick and violent, it requires a number of checks to prevent

an improper use, or rather abuse, of such extensive powers.

As all military operations require vigour and constancy, it is evident that a monarchical government is singularly adapted to war. Different from despotism, regular plans and systems may be pursued, and the government is sufficiently strong to execute them with the necessary vigour. As the subjects are attached to the Sovereign chiefly by the idea of glory, they cheerfully concur with him in supporting an offensive war; if successful, their efforts increase, and therefore are not easily checked. Misfortunes, and consequently a defensive war, allay their courage. They soon perceive they do not fight for themselves, and feel only the miseries of the war, which they suppose is carried on to gratify the ambition and caprice of the sovereign, or of some favourite. Hence it is, that monarchies in general are more adapted to an offensive than a defensive war.

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Pursuing the metaphor adopted above, I will say that a republican government is like a great river, formed by a multiplicity of springs and rivulets, different in that from a despotic, or a monarchy, which arises from one alone. If the comparison be just, it follows, that in this kind of government there should be a sufficient force to collect and unite the different springs, and give the whole that *precise direction* which is most advantageous. A republican government, however, labours under this very great disadvantage: It is almost impossible to determine what degree of power ought to be vested in the executive part of the state, so that it should be sufficient to answer every purpose of government, and how to form such checks as may effectually prevent any abuse of that power to the danger of the state. Is it too much, liberty is gone; is it too little, anarchy ensues. The very long duration of the republic of Venice would induce one to conclude, that those wise

republicans had resolved this very difficult problem.

The extreme difficulty of *collecting*, *uniting*, and *directing* the national forces in a republican government, shews that it is by no means calculated for war, and much less for an offensive one. Its principles being founded in equality, it is evident that war of every kind ought to be avoided, because it necessarily throws too much power into the hands of one or few men, which finally destroy the government. It is also from the want of unity and sufficient force to exert the powers of the state, that all confederacies, however formidable, have failed in their schemes, if the war has been of any duration. The famous league of Cambray, the leagues formed against France at different times, and against Austria; that against Prussia in the last war, and a hundred more, were dissolved without producing any effect proportioned to their forces.

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Republics, unless formed upon military principles, as was that of the Romans, are totally unfit for action. Nothing could unite the Greek republics against Persia, till the time of Alexander the Great, when they had nearly lost their liberty ; but when attacked, what prodigious efforts did they not make for the common cause. It is certainly true, that republics, unless forced by the immediate sense of danger, never have that unanimity and vigour necessary to carry on a war with any probability of success, and therefore are proper only for a defensive war. There, indeed, their efforts increase in proportion to the danger with which they are threatened ; and if the motives arise from civil or religious principles, they generally become invincible. When such motives disappear, and the sense of danger vanishes, each party pursues its own interest, and the confederacy is dissolved.

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I am so convinced of the truth of this reasoning, that I have not the least doubt, if we could hold New-York, Long Island, Rhode Island, and Philadelphia, and cease to make those fruitless and unmeaning excursions in the American woods, that the Congress and the rebel people, no longer united by the sense of fear, would soon dissolve their confederacy, and a more favourable opportunity would offer of restoring peace and union between them and the mother country. The troops employed on the American Continent might enable us to strike some capital stroke in the West Indies, which would constrain our enemies to bring a part of their forces to that country; for in the West Indies is their weak part, and there they may be attacked with advantage.

C H A P. IV.

Of the French Invasion expected: their objects: the difficulties which they have to encounter: and the advantages on the side of Great Britain.

WHILE the terrors of an invasion and its consequences hang over our heads, it is the duty of every man to contribute with his person and advice to the support of the state, and point out the means which appear proper to defeat the designs of our enemies. With this view I have wrote the following discourse on the supposed invasion, and hope it may serve, in some measure, to render it fruitless, and inspire government, as well as the nation in general, with that confidence which the situation of our affairs require. Without confidence, his Majesty cannot avail himself

himself, with any prospect of success, of the national forces.

The enemies, superior at sea, and moreover, having a land force sufficient for any purpose, may have three objects in view. The first and most capital would be to land a powerful army in England. If success should follow their operations, it is evident we must conclude a peace on any terms, and the war is soon brought to an end. This enterprize is decisive, and therefore preferable to any other.

Their next object might be to take possession of the Western provinces, and to maintain themselves there for a few months only, without making any further progress into the country ; then our commerce would be totally intercepted, and our whole attention confined to the immediate defence of the state ; so that our foreign settlements would, in a short time, fall of course into their hands.

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Such an expedition is very bold, but it is equally dangerous, and it might prove fatal to their army. It is possible, therefore, that their shew and parade should be intended only to keep us at home, and ruin our trade, while, with the rest of their forces, they attack our colonies, Gibraltar, Minorca, &c.

Finally, to increase our distress, the combined enemies may land fifteen or twenty thousand men in the Bay of Galway, and cover themselves with the Shannon. The inhabitants of Connaught, equally poor and ignorant, might be induced to join them, and it would not be an easy matter to drive their army out of that country, if their fleet could support their army with provisions. Such a scheme offers all the advantages of *the* former, without being subject to the same difficulties as *the* second; the season being now far advanced, it is probable they may not think it eligible to attempt an invasion in England
for

for the present, and next year we shall be much better prepared to receive them. Perhaps they may then find it too dangerous an undertaking, and without adopting any of the two first plans we have supposed, they will attempt to land in Ireland, or only shew themselves in the Channel. However, as an invasion of England, with a powerful army, may be attended with fatal consequences, I shall confine my observation to that alone, and endeavour to shew how it may be frustrated.

The appearance and force of the combined fleet prove the intention of bringing affairs to a speedy conclusion, and had they met with us, and fought with success, I have not the least doubt they would have invaded this kingdom with a formidable number of troops. Every thing was then, and is now prepared for that purpose: when I consider their immense superiority, and foresee the probable event of a battle, I cannot help ap-

plauding those councils which tended to avoid it, as well as the prudence with which they were followed. Time and delays, at this moment, and at this season of the year, are a victory. Had we beat the combined fleet, little more would have been attained, whereas the loss of a battle might have been fatal.

While our fleet is entire, though we may, for a time, be forced out of the sea, yet am I persuaded that no invasion can take place. It is always a dangerous enterprize, and not to be attempted while there remains a possibility of our appearing at sea ; which may happen from a thousand circumstances arising from wind and weather, in the winter especially, when the combined fleet must separate, and all communication with the army they may have landed must be cut off. Our fleet, in the mean time, may intercept their convoys, and block up the harbour when they have established their *dépôts* ; so that in a short time
their

their troops must perish. It is not enough that they debark an army, it must be continually supplied and protected from France, otherwise, however numerous, it cannot make any progress or penetrate into the country.

If, contrary to our hopes and expectations, the British fleet is beat and drove into some harbour, and the enemy does land a powerful army, we must not despond, nor by groundless fears facilitate the success of the invaders: a just and entire confidence in government is necessary to our preservation, and the common danger should produce an union of all parties in the defence of their country. It is needless to trace the causes which have brought our affairs to this crisis; such a task would only lead to sordid division and discontent, when concord and harmony are most required. But I would beg leave to recommend to the stockholders not to be alarmed, and let their fears prevail over their reason. If

to secure their property, they draw on their bankers, and attempt at once to realize their securities, they will infallibly bring ruin and destruction on themselves and families. For though there be a sufficient sum to answer every purpose of trade and circulation, as well as to pay the interest allowed on such securities, successively as it becomes due, yet is there not in this, nor in any other country, money enough to pay off all the principals, and if it is attempted, a bankruptcy must ensue; the monied men are ruined, and the whole nation is thrown into a convulsion, which may prove incurable, particularly if the enemy is in the country. Whereas if they remain quiet, and repose a proper confidence in Government, we shall, no doubt, be able to repel the danger which threatens us. The resources of this country are numerous, they are great, and when properly exerted, will enable us to overcome our enemies, however formidable,

dable, and force them to lay down their arms.

Though the frontier of a country, as is that of England, may be very extensive, and therefore seems very difficult to be defended; yet upon a due examination, it will be always found, that such a frontier can be attacked only in few points, and that these points are fixed and determined by the nature and position of the countries at war. An army, like a traveller, must necessarily depart from a given point, and proceed to a given point in the enemy's country. The line which unites these points, I call *the Line of Operation*. It is manifest that all deviation from this, and all delays in pursuing the march, are so much time lost; and in the end, will force an enemy to return either for want of subsistence, or by bad weather, &c. To diminish the difficulties which oppose the progress of the main army on the Line of Operation, sometimes a corps is made

to act on another line to create a diversion ; but such a corps can never produce a solid advantage, if you attend to the main point, and frustrate the designs of the principal army.

When the frontiers of the contending powers are contiguous, the magazines formed in the country which attacks may for some time supply the invading army, until by a victory it is enabled to take some capital fortress, and secure a tract of the enemy's country sufficient to form a new *dépôt* to support the whole, or a great part of the troops, during the winter. If this cannot be executed, it is evident the attacking army must, after a fruitless campaign, return to its own country. In proportion as an army advances into the enemy's country, new *dépôts* must be continually formed, and these as near as possible ; for when they are at any considerable distance, the convoys arrive slow, require strong escorts, and are so precarious,
that

that the army can neither move nor act, especially if the country is close and the defending enemy active: let him give his whole attention to attack the invading army's communications, and he must live day and night on their Line of Operation. In general, commanders mistake the principles of a defensive war, and very absurdly endeavour to check and stop the progress of an enemy, by opposing him in front in some advantageous post, which method is, for the most part, ineffectual or dangerous. You are often forced to a general action, whose consequences may be fatal, as victory will enable your adversary to fix himself in some part of the country, from whence, the ensuing campaign, he begins his operations sooner, and with additional advantages. This cannot be done if you avoid a general action, and employ the greatest part of your forces on his Line of operation, which is the only effectual and sure means to stop his progress; let him advance in front, the
length

length of his line will weaken it, and offer your attacks certain and decisive success.

If the frontiers are not contiguous, and be separated by the territories of other Princes, by forests, deserts, mountains, and above all by the sea; it is clear, that so many difficulties will occur in such an undertaking, as that of an invasion, that it is almost impossible it should succeed.

An army which acts over a branch of the sea, must occupy some convenient and safe harbour; gain a great and decisive battle, or by skilful manœuvres force the enemy to abandon such a tract of country as will, in a great measure, support the assailant; for if he depends in the smallest degree on shipping, and a precarious navigation for supplies, he cannot prosecute any solid operation, and successive campaigns will be consumed in fruitless and unmeaning excursions;
troops

troops must, however, return to the shore to take up their winter quarters, and at last his men and money being exhausted, he perishes totally, or abandons the enterprize with loss and ignominy.

From hence it appears, that an offensive war must be prosecuted with the utmost vigour and activity; for nothing less than compleat victories can render it successful. Consequently a defensive war must be carried on with caution and prudence, and above all things, a general action is to be avoided. You oppose the enemy in front by occupying strong posts, and with the remainder of your forces you act on his flanks and rear; which in a short time will reduce him, though much stronger, to fall back and approach his *dépôts*. If King Harold had followed this doctrine, it is probable we should have known William the Conqueror by his defeat only.

Let us now apply the principles established above to the present case.

It is evident that *Brest* is the point from whence the French must depart; because all their operations, even when they have landed, are connected with and depend upon their fleet. But as all operations which depend on navigation, are, from its nature, precarious, and liable to a thousand difficulties, they must have likewise a place of arms in this country, a spacious harbour, as near their own coast as possible, &c. and besides these advantages, absolutely required, the place must be so situated that by marching a few miles inland, they can occupy such a post as will render them masters of a tract of country behind their army sufficient to supply it with subsistence on their stops; without which, no progress can be made, nor can they remain for any considerable time in any part of the country. The plan
which

which offers these advantages, is the most eligible of any they can fix upon.

Plymouth answers perfectly this description. It is a safe and convenient harbour, near the coast of France; and by marching only to Chudleigh, the invaders will be masters of Cornwall, Devonshire, and part of Somersetshire, where they can find provisions in abundance; which will enable them to prosecute their operations, and penetrate further into the country, or if they chuse to remain there, it would be a difficult matter to drive them back, as they would have a fleet at Plymouth; and our trade being once destroyed, we must conclude a peace on the terms they chuse to impose upon us. I am happy to find that such measures have been taken by Government for the defence of that very important place, as leave us no room to fear for it.

When a *coup de main* only is intended, you must debark as near the
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object you have in view as possible, because the success depends on secrecy and surprise: but when you propose to wage war in a country, you are to land your troops at a distance, that you may have time to bring your stores on shore, fortify a camp, take some capital position, and then proceed gradually towards the point you have in view. General O'Reilly, in his expedition against Algier, adopted another mode, and failed in the enterprise; he lost great part of his army, and his reputation as an officer.

Next to *Plymouth*, the only place which can serve the purpose of the enemy, is *Portsmouth*. It has two fine roads, St. Helen and Spithead, and a very safe harbour. The town and the dock on the land side are fortified, and cannot be taken without a regular siege, the undertaking of which is very difficult, though we had no ships to defend it. The island of *Portsea* lies very low, and does not furnish the
 neces-

necessary materials to carry on the works,
 required on such occasions. The enemy
 must occupy Gosport with part of his
 army, while the remainder carries on the
 siege, and if we are masters of Portsdown,
 and can confine him to the island, we
 are always able to succour the place, and
 force him to retire, which he would find
 no easy matter. The lines of Gosport
 are of no use, and those towards Ports-
 down are against us, if the invader is in
 the island, being calculated only to stop
 an enemy coming from Portsdown, which
 I presume he never will be permitted to
 occupy. The lines of Gosport are
 equally imperfect, a good fort should be
 raised on a rising ground, a few hundred
 yards off, which would render it impos-
 sible for the enemy to attempt any thing
 on that side. In case he should ever land
 in the island of Portssea, a few redoubts
 must also be added before the front of the
 works which cover the dock, to prevent
 his approaching near enough to throw
 shells into the dock, which he might now
 do,

object you have in view as possible, because the success depends on secrecy and surprize: but when you propose to wage war in a country, you are to land your troops at a distance, that you may have time to bring your stores on shore, fortify a camp, take some capital position, and then proceed gradually towards the point you have in view. General O'Reilly, in his expedition against Algier, adopted another mode, and failed in the enterprize; he lost great part of his army, and his reputation as an officer.

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neces-

neceſſary materials to carry on the works, required on ſuch occaſions. The enemy muſt occupy Goſport with part of his army, while the remainder carries on the ſiege, and if we are maſters of Portſdown, and can confine him to the iſland, we are always able to ſuccour the place, and force him to retire, which he would find no eaſy matter. The lines of Goſport are of no uſe, and thoſe towards Portſdown are againſt us, if the invader is in the iſland, being calculated only to ſtop an enemy coming from Portſdown, which I preſume he never will be permitted to occupy. The lines of Goſport are equally imperfect, a good fort ſhould be raiſed on a riſing ground, a few hundred yards off, which would render it impoſſible for the enemy to attempt any thing on that ſide. In caſe he ſhould ever land in the iſland of Portſea, a few redoubts muſt alſo be added before the front of the works which cover the dock, to prevent his approaching near enough to throw ſhells into the dock, which he might now
do,

do, as those works are not advanced far enough into the country ; an unreasonable respect for private property having occasioned their being kept so far back.

When I considered at first the position of the *Isle of Wight*, I thought that an enemy might occupy it, and with fifteen or twenty thousand men keep possession of the whole ground ; but having lately examined it with proper attention, I believe now that it is absolutely impossible. This island runs from East to West, and is generally intersected with very high mountains, whose basis run quite to the shore. On the South side of the island they rise by ranges, like an amphitheatre, almost perpendicular, forty or fifty feet high, and the summits, excepting in a very few places, to above a thousand ; so that if any troops are posted on them, there is no possibility of landing. The only place where it is less difficult is in Brading Bay, opposite St. Helen's Road. This is a small creek
between

between two very high hills, which being occupied, will prevent a landing. On the South side is a bay, where the shore is low, and very proper for debarking troops; but Sandown Fort defends that bay very well. From thence to the Westernmost point and the Needles, no place is found where a landing can be attempted if there is the least opposition: Besides, the coast is so open and dangerous, that a boat, much less a fleet, cannot lay at anchor an hour without the utmost risk of perishing. From the Needles to Ride you may land any where, and a fleet may anchor in safety, there being a sufficient depth of water for men of war to come through the Needles, and all the way up to Spithead. The channel between the *Needles* and *Hurst Castle* is narrow, but it is safe for the largest vessels. The Castle does not seem sufficiently strong against ships of force; but if two considerable batteries were erected on the two points which project into the sea opposite the fortress,

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came up the river very well ; but how long did they remain there ? A few hours only. Consider, besides, the great difference there is between coming from the coast of Holland with twenty men of war, to make a ridiculous bravado, which lasted twenty-four hours, or coming from Brest with a fleet, and four or five hundred transports to invade us, and to carry on a war into the heart of our country. The one is easy, the other impracticable.

Though I am convinced such an attempt neither will nor can be made in Suffex, Kent, or higher up ; I do not think it impossible, that in order to facilitate the operations of their main army, the enemies may threaten different and distant parts of the coast ; but no solid operation can, in my opinion, be executed but in the West.

Upon this supposition, it appears that our troops are too much scattered, and
cannot

cannot be brought together without a great loss of time, wherever they may land.

Whenever a tract of country is to be defended, reason points out the necessity of occupying some *central positions*, with strong corps to the right and left, to stop the enemy till the whole can be collected. *The Line we have to defend extends from Plymouth to Dover.* Portsmouth is the central point in that line, I would therefore recommend, that a third part of our army be placed there and in the New Forest; another third on *Hall Down Hill*, beyond Exeter; and the remaining third *in the limits between Sussex and Kent*, on that branch of the river Medway, called the Teise. If an attempt is made to the Westward, the body encamped at Portsmouth will march thither, and join that on Hall Down, which I suppose instantly in motion where the invasion is attempted. The body placed in Sussex may remain there, and by a

movement to the right or left, be any where, as occasion may require, and easily repulse every attempt made on that coast.

Should the enemy land at Plymouth, which I think most probable, for the reasons already assigned, the regiments now there will be able to dispute the ground, until those on Hall Down can come to their assistance; and it does not require twenty-four hours march. Opposed in front by the corps at Plymouth, which is covered by the works now raising there, as well as by the natural strength of the country, and attacked in the rear by the troops coming from Hall Down, an enemy, though far superior in number, would find himself greatly embarrassed. Surrounded by the sea, by strong forts, and a stronger country, occupied by fifteen or twenty thousand men, without ground sufficiently extensive to form a line, I do not conceive it possible how he could avoid a total overthrow.

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There is not a spot about Plymouth, if properly occupied, and protected by the most inconsiderable works, but will require a siege to force you, which cannot be undertaken while you have any body of troops in the neighbourhood.

The same difficulties, and much greater, will occur to an enemy in the island of Portsea; he can neither subsist there, nor from the adjacent country, if we have a camp on Portsdown, and another in the New Forest.

From what we have said, it seems evident that no invasion can take place, until our fleet, entirely drove out of the sea, is forced to hide itself for a considerable time in some harbour; and that such an invasion cannot be prosecuted with any probability of success, unless the enemy is master of Plymouth or Portsmouth. Let us now proceed to examine the consequences, in case such an event should happen.

Supposing the enemy is in possession of Plymouth, he cannot remain there for ever; he will, in a short time, be forced to penetrate further into the country, in order to procure supplies of provision, or abandon his post for want of them. To remain there with any safety, he must occupy and fortify Mount Edgecumbe, and the ground behind the King's Brewhouse, as well as all the ground between the Tamar and that branch of the sea which runs under Mr. Parker's garden to the bridge at the three mile stone, coming to London; he should moreover have a body of troops in Mr. Parker's ground. Forty or fifty thousand men would not be sufficient for the purpose, because these being separated from the sea and the Tamar, could not, in case of an attack, support each other; and if one only of them is defeated, the others must fall successively, and in a very short time. The greatest part of the invader's army will naturally be posted between the Tamar

mar and the sea, by the bridge above mentioned, which puts the Docks, Storehouse, and Plymouth behind them; this distance is near five miles, and requires twenty thousand men to defend it, which they cannot easily do, for the ground rises gradually from the shore to Dartmoor, so that you have every possible advantage in attacking their posts. The most sure method, however, would be to attack the corps placed at Mount Edgumbe, which being beat, the others must be destroyed. Mount Edgumbe is the key of Plymouth, and must be kept with care.

Though the enemies are in possession of all the different posts above mentioned, and have thereby a place of arms, and a fine harbour for their fleet, with which, for a time, they may put an intire stop to all our trade and navigation, yet it can only be for a time. The *combined fleet* cannot always remain there, and the army consisting of fifty or sixty thousand men,

men, cooped up in such narrow limits, cannot subsist by the supplies brought from France. They must therefore advance into the country or abandon it. The only decisive operation they could execute would be, to leave ten thousand men at Plymouth, and with the remainder proceed directly to Hall Down, between Chudleigh and Exeter, which is about thirty-six miles from Plymouth. This position is very strong, whether it is taken with the front towards Exeter, or towards Plymouth. There is no passing between the enemy's right, and the sea; and by an easy movement on the left, he is in the mountains, through which all the western roads must pass towards Cornwall. By taking this position, the enemy would be master of Devonshire and Cornwall, which would furnish subsistence in abundance, and having Teignmouth, Torbay, and Dartmouth very near, he would also receive from France whatever he wanted. Possessed of these advantages, and having a very strong country

country easily to be defended, it would become difficult to drive him back; and while his fleet, destroying our trade, rode triumphant at sea, we should be reduced to accept of any peace he chused to dictate. It is therefore incumbent upon us to post ourselves so, that we may be near enough to prevent an invading army from penetrating into the country, if we cannot hinder it from taking Plymouth. The means and method of doing this (of confining him to the shore) depending chiefly on the nature of the country, I shall therefore give a description of it, so far as it relates to military operations.

All countries are either *open* or *close*. By an *open* country, I mean that where an army, or a considerable body of troops, can almost any where find sufficient room to form in, and to act; consequently, by a *close* country, I mean that where an army, in the course of many miles, cannot find room to form and act in. By the word *defile*, I mean a
narrow

narrow pass formed by mountains, hills, forests, rivers, morasses, hedges, &c. where the road is so contracted, that few men only can advance in front. In the first species of country, it is evident, that superior numbers must prevail, if the troops are equal in goodness, and the commander knows how to avail himself of that superiority; for this plain reason, that he can bring a greater number of men into action at any given time, and at any given point, than his adversary. Whereas in a close country, number is nothing, and disposition is every thing. In such a country, points only can be attacked, and by a given number of men only. So that if you occupy these points, though otherwise much inferior to the enemy, you may bring more men into action than he, and consequently prevail: besides, these points may be such as to enable you to attack him in front, flank and rear at the same time.

England,

England, in general, is of this last kind; the western country is not only very hilly, but also for the most part full of inclosures. As you come from Exeter towards London, it is so inclosed with hedges and ditches, that for many miles together, you do not find ground sufficiently open to form twenty battalions upon; so that the high road, where an army can alone march, is one continued pass, or defile, winding at the foot of the mountains, or through the inclosures, of which you may see the specimen in Plate II. Those mountains and hedges, being properly occupied, an enemy cannot advance a step; and if he is once engaged in them, he can never extricate himself out of the narrow labyrinth, and will be forced to lay down his arms.

There are two roads, which may be called military roads, from Plymouth to Exeter; the one passes by Ivy Bridge, Chudleigh and Ashburton. The other by Ivy Bridge, Totness, Newton Bushel, and over Hall
Down

Down Hill to Exeter. On the first road there are but two places, viz. Hall Down, four miles beyond Exeter, and a heath two miles beyond Chudleigh, where any considerable body of men can form upon. The remainder of the road is one continued defile, intersected by mountains, rivers, hedges and numberless rivulets, besides the Teign and the Dart, which come from Dartmoor, and fall into the sea. Though these are not very deep, yet being near the mountains, they are very rapid, and when the rain falls (which is frequent in the West) become very dangerous torrents; their beds are full of large stones, and the banks high, so that you can get over them only at the bridges, where the high road passes. The whole country between this road and the sea coast, from Exmouth to Plymouth, is exactly the same, so that an army can march but in *one column*. If to avoid the difficulties and dangers which arise from such a disposition, the enemy should separate his

his

his forces, and advance in two columns, along the two roads above mentioned; there being no communication by means of cross roads, you may attack either or both columns separately, for they cannot support each other until they come to Hall Down: nor in all that tract of country is there a single spot where you may not attack the enemy in front, flank and rear, since the road is continually winding round the foot of the hills.

Between the Teign and the Dart the ground is rather more hilly, and more easily defended. There is but one narrow road, which goes from Dartmouth to Newton Bushel, near which the tide flows. A few miles from Dartmouth, a branch of it turns off to Totness, and several paths from towns on the coast, as Torbay, Paygnton, &c. come into the main road, leading to Hall Down or to Plymouth. However, a body of men landing between
Dartmouth

Dartmouth and Teignmouth, must finally pass through Newton Bushel in their way to Exeter, or through Totness going to Plymouth. There goes likewise from Dartmouth to Plymouth a road over the mountains, by Modbury. All these roads are equally difficult, inasmuch that no wheel carriages are used by the farmers, who carry in their harvest on horses. The only proper places between Plymouth and Exmouth where ships can approach, are Dartmouth and Teignmouth; but as the entrance is very narrow, and entirely commanded by mountains, a few battalions would easily prevent a landing.

From Teignmouth, towards Exeter, there runs a very high mountain called Hall Down or Haldon Hill, already mentioned. The top is a fine plain, where a numerous army might camp and act. All the roads, as I have said, to and from the West, pass over it; but an army
can

can come upon it only by the two roads, leading from Newton Bushel and Exmouth, both very difficult. On the south side towards the Teign and Newton Bushel, the hill is rapid. On the west side it falls gradually, and forms many small hills, whose basis form very deep ravins : these hills project quite into the sea, which does not admit of any convenient place for landing troops, and is moreover so shallow that no ships of burthen can approach the shore. Upon the whole, the country from Exeter to Plymouth is so extremely close and difficult, that a few men, properly disposed, will stop, and ruin a numerous army.

From Exeter, where most of the western roads join, there are but two roads towards Salisbury, which may be practicable for an army; to Axminster there is only one. At this place begin the two, one to the left through Yeovil, Sherborne, Shaftesbury, and over the G Downs;

Downs; the other to the right by Bridport, Dorchester and Blandford, to Salisbury. The first road as far as Shaftesbury is intersected by numberless hills and vallies, extremely close and cultivated, so that an army can march only in one column. There is scarce a spot where you cannot occupy some post across the road to prevent an enemy from advancing, while the hedges on both sides, lined with your infantry, would so embarrass him, that he could neither advance or retire, or indeed make any defence on the ground for want of room to form a line. From Shaftesbury to Salisbury the road passes over a narrow down, having on one side a high ridge of mountains, which runs towards Blandford, and Cranbourn chace, and on the other a deep and wide valley very close. This down is also cut by a great number of ravins, so that very often there is not room to form a single battalion. If the ridge of mountains, and the valley are occupied, no army can proceed

proceed on the high road ; nor can it be separated into several columns, without exposing them to be beat in detail, as from the nature of the ground they cannot support each other. The road which goes by Bridport is extremely difficult till you are about two miles beyond that place ; then the country opening as far as Salisbury, becomes less inclosed, and offers every where ground sufficient to form a numerous army upon, and very proper for a general action, if you are superior in cavalry.

From Salisbury two roads go towards London : the first by Andover, Basingstoke, Bagshot, Egham, Staines, &c. Near the seven mile stone a branch goes by Stockbridge over some very high hills, and joins it at Basingstoke : this branch passes through an open country, which however being very high, offers many excellent camps. The first is also carried for some miles through an open

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country ;

country ; but about Andover, and from thence to Basingstoke, and Hartford-bridge, it is very close. The other road goes by Rumsey, Farnham, &c. through a country which is still more close than the former, and in proportion affords greater advantages in attacking the enemy.

It is needless to prosecute this description any further, because I am persuaded, that no army, however numerous, will ever be able to penetrate forty miles into the country, if proper methods are taken to oppose it, and if we know how to avail ourselves of the numberless resources which may be drawn from the face of the country. And I have no doubt, from the known experience, firmness, and abilities of the commander in chief*, but that the event, should an invasion take place, will justify the high trust that his Majesty has placed in him, and fully answer the expectations of the public.

* Lord Amherst.

The description I have given is exceedingly imperfect, as no map, plan, or drawing, can convey a true military, and adequate idea of any country. The eye alone, and a good one, accustomed to view ground on a grand scale, very different from that of a parade, can do it effectually. I think, however, that what I have said, if read with attention, accompanied with the Map annexed, (*Plate 1.*) will shew the lines on which the enemy can act, as well as the advantages or disadvantages of the country, through which such lines must necessarily pass. The commander in chief, and his officers, upon examining the ground, will easily fix the particular *points* where to act, while these points, and the *motions* of the enemy will shew *how* to act, as circumstances may require.

C H A P. V.

Observations on the method of ranging the Troops, and of making War, &c. and additional detail of the Invaders difficulties.

THE French army has, no doubt, some advantages over ours at present (the veteran regiments being almost all in America): it is composed of old corps, which have been accustomed to exercise and discipline for many years; the officers of the higher ranks have seen service, and many of them have commanded separate corps during the last war. The habit of being united for a long time *together*, gives them a facility in manœuvring, a consistency and adherence of parts, if I may so call it, not so easily broke as in new levies; all which must insure them a great superiority in a plain and open country, and in a
general

general action. In a close country, where the combat is partial, and confined to particular posts, valour and a good disposition will supply, in a great measure, the defects inherent to new corps.

Though in point of discipline, our enemies, at present, enjoy some advantages over us, we possess so many over them, in every other respect, that, if we avail ourselves of them, there can be no room left to fear the event of the invasion, with which we are now threatened.

1st, The face of the country forces them to march in one column; and this difficulty alone overbalances almost every other advantage.

2dly, They have but little cavalry, which, from the nature of the country, may not, if we chuse it, ever have an opportunity of acting.

G 4

3dly, They

3dly, They can have no heavy artillery, and not many field pieces, compared to what we can bring into the field.

4thly, They can have no other provisions but what they bring with them, which, however abundant it may seem, will last only for a very short time.

5thly, They can never have a sufficient number of horses and carriages to transport their stores, artillery, baggage, provisions, &c. which will retard their march, so that they cannot advance above a mile or two in one day.

6thly, When they proceed from the shore, they can form no magazines in the country, and must be supplied from their original *dépôt* ; and when their line of communication is protracted to a certain length, half their army will not be sufficient to escort their convoys, which you may, and must intercept. This will not only retard their progress,

gress, but very soon stop them entirely. and force their army to go back. They have but this alternative, to gain a great and decisive victory, or abandon the enterprise. They cannot remain on the spot, in a close country, surrounded by mountains on every side, and those occupied by our troops : and we have nothing to do but to profit of these advantages, and avoid a general action.

7thly, They cannot send detachments, or deviate from the great road, without being exposed to certain destruction : whereas we, availing ourselves of every cross road and path, can without risk attack their whole line of march, and soon throw it into confusion. They can act on that only ; whereas we can act where, and when we please.

To these natural advantages we may, I think, procure others from a different manner of ranging the troops, and of carrying on the war.

The

The present mode of ranging the infantry three men deep, armed with muskets only, is subject to many and very great defects.

First, The line becomes too extensive, and is therefore weak ; it cannot advance in any ground, particularly in a close one, without the greatest difficulties and delays, contrary to the very principle of military operations, which should be as quick as lightning.

Secondly, It is inadequate to almost every purpose of war, as well against infantry as cavalry, and proper only for fighting at a distance. If you approach the enemy, the line is too weak, the arms too short for a shock, and veteran troops will have a decisive superiority. Placed behind entrenchments, hedges, ditches, &c. which naturally offer great advantages, you can make no resistance from the moment the enemy attacks them, so that unless you keep him off
by

by your fire, he penetrates somewhere, and you must abandon the whole, or be taken in flank, and cut to pieces,

To remedy these defects, I humbly propose, that the infantry be ranged four deep, and that the fourth rank be armed with a Pike eleven or twelve feet long, two feet of which must be made of steel, two inches broad, to cut on each side, without any hatchet, or cross bar, that it may easily pass through the hedges. This fourth rank must be composed of the tallest and strongest men.

This formation will render the line less extensive, stronger, and much more active, is proper for every operation, and particularly adapted to our country, every where inclosed with hedges and ditches. In a plain, no infantry formed in the usual manner can resist its shocks an instant, or even approach your line, much less if this is placed behind an entrenchment, or hedge. Moreover, if

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you

you form a battalion or two into squares, protected by some howitzers on the flanks, no cavalry, however brave, can overturn them. The three first ranks protected by a row of Pikes, which project before them at least five feet, will feel the advantage, and soon find their superiority in whatever ground they are attacked, as well as in attacking the enemy :—(*Plate 3.*)—Let an experiment be made, the event will shew the superiority of the method I propose over that now in practice. It is a novelty. Very true ; and this novelty will not a little disconcert the enemy.

C H A P. VI.

Of the Order of Battle.

THE order of battle now adopted in Europe is, in many respects, defective and absurd. The infantry and cavalry formed three deep make the line so very extensive, that it loses all its activity, which is the soul of military manœuvres, and alone can insure success : infomuch that it may be established as an axiom, that the army which moves and marches with the greatest velocity, must, from that circumstance alone, finally prevail. Our military institutions exclude every idea of celerity ; hence it is that our victories are never compleat and decisive, and that our attacks are reduced to some particular points, which gained or lost, the battle is over ; the enemy retires
generally

generally in good order, because from the extent and slowness of our motions we cannot pursue him with any vigour; he occupies some neighbouring hill, and we have to begin again. Moreover, the position of the cavalry in a line on the flanks of the infantry, is such that it retards the motions of the whole, because none can advance unless the whole line does; besides, it cannot from its situation there support the infantry, or be supported by it: the moment is lost before you can bring the cavalry where it is wanted. The reason assigned for placing the cavalry on the flanks is absurd, *viz.* to cover the flanks of the infantry.—Pray, is not the flank of the cavalry much weaker than that of the infantry? since it cannot in any manner form a flank to protect itself, much less will it protect the flank of the infantry. Three or four battalions, armed with Pikes, and formed into oblong squares, are the only flanks which can effectually cover the line against infantry or cavalry,
and

and they must have, besides field-pieces, ten or twelve twelve-pounders, and a few howitzers. (*Plate 3.*)

Cavalry must never appear but in the moment it is brought to action, action being the very essence of the cavalry. When the ground, or other circumstances, do not permit you to bring it to action, it must be kept back behind the infantry, whose flanks, secured as I propose, have nothing to fear. If you think your line too weak, though it is much stronger than any other formed in the usual way, let every third or fourth battalion in the line be formed into squares, as those in the flanks, and be assured nothing can resist their efforts, much less overturn and break the line.

In the manner our line is now formed, not a third of the army is engaged, and that successively ; so that numbers are of no use, and only serve to retard its motions, and increase the expence. To remedy

medy these defects I would humbly propose, that all the infantry be formed in such a manner, that between each battalion, or regiment, an interval of one hundred and fifty yards be left; behind these intervals I would have the cavalry placed in two lines at a proper distance, each squadron separately, with intervals to manœuvre upon. (*Plate 3.*)

The first advantage resulting from this disposition is, that you may extend your line to any length, without any danger. The second, that you bring the whole into action at once, and though the enemy be double the number, you may out-flank him, and are in reality stronger than him, for you attack his whole front with superior forces. The third, that the motions of the whole line are more rapid, as each regiment or battalion moves and acts by itself; and though some may be more advanced than others, no inconvenience can arise from it, because if the enemy is imprudent

prudent enough to break his line to attack such advanced battalion, upon the right and left, he will find others formed into squares to take him on both flanks; and if he advances a certain length out of his line, you order your battalion to stop, or even retire *à la débandade*, and in that instant you order some of your squadrons to move forwards through the intervals full gallop, and to charge pell-mell; as one horseman acting in this manner has more real activity than seventy who advance and attack in a line as usual. I saw once three hundred horse attack a column of seven or eight thousand foot in this way, which they defeated and dispersed in three or four minutes. The fourth advantage is, that if your line is broke in some places, the enemy cannot avail himself of the disorder, because your cavalry advances, and gives the infantry time to recover. The fifth, that if your infantry breaks that of the enemy in any point, then advance your first line of cavalry to attack and disperse it, the

H whole

whole moving forwards rapidly at the same time, which will infallibly produce a general slaughter, and your victory is complete and decisive. The last advantage of this order of battle which I shall mention is, that it is *general, and equally adapted to every species of country*, when an army can act in the least. In an open country you combine the action of cavalry with that of the infantry, and heavy artillery. In a close country, where an extensive line cannot be formed, the original formation of the troops enables you to act separately, as the ground may require, by corps, detachments, brigades, or regiments, and that always with superior vigour and activity. *It is peculiarly adapted to our country*; I hope, therefore, it will be received and applied on the present occasion.

C H A P. VII.

Of the general Method of making War.

OUR armies, however numerous, are united in one body formed in two or three lines. Between this army and that of the enemy, at a certain distance, the light troops, very often amounting to twenty thousand men, form another army, which is called a chain to observe the enemy, prevent his coming upon you unawares, and cover the march of the grand army. Sometimes also detachments of them are sent to escort your convoys, or to cover a certain district, while the army acts on another line. These light troops, though very numerous, they consider only as mere scouts to observe the enemy, insomuch that on a day of battle they are not to be found, and seldom or ever take part in the

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action.

action. Whether you advance to the enemy, or the enemy comes to you, the light troops disperse to the right and left, and you hear no more of them till the next day. Why on such occasions they do not form on the right and left of the army, at a convenient distance, and attack the enemy on the flanks, is to me as inconceivable as the use now made of them appears ridiculous and absurd. Four or five hundred men, including one hundred hussars, distributed into small parties in the woods, behind the hedges, near the high roads, would observe the enemy much better than ten thousand men. The motions of such a body as that of an army of light troops, are too slow, and always before the eyes of the enemy, so that he can mark them, and make some capital manœuvres without your knowledge. Whereas a chain of small parties going every where, unite or disperse in a moment, and are always invisible, so that it is impossible for the enemy to make any kind of movement

ment without your having timely notice.

The great defect of the present method of acting is, that however numerous your army may be, if it is formed in one body, your motions are extremely slow. Secondly, the enemy may direct his march so that he outflanks you. Thirdly, you must have a great body of troops between you and him to watch his motions. Fourthly and finally, by marching against him in a line whose direction is perpendicular to his front, you cannot out-flank him. To remedy these very capital defects, I would beg leave to propose another mode of distributing the troops of which our army is composed.

In order to explain what I have to say on this subject, I must premise, First, that a man or body of men, as an army, can defend themselves only in front; consequently, if you can attack them on

either, or both flanks, you will easily beat them, and much more so if you come upon them in the rear. Hence it is that Nature points out the danger, and raises that *panic* with which an army is seized when the men apprehend that they are attacked in the rear ; conscious of their weakness, they generally fly in confusion. Sometimes the face of the country obliges an enemy to contract his front, as when he comes upon you in columns : then the moment is favourable to attack him, before he has time to form his line. Sometimes by your throwing up some Redoubts before your front, (*Plate 3.*) he is obliged to break his line, and to advance in columns : this likewise is an occasion to attack him with advantage. Both are, however, too generally neglected. Men, for the most part, fix on a given spot to fight, which they will not quit, though the enemy in his progress gives many opportunities to a successful attack. They make their arrangements on paper, and
by

by the slowness of their movements abide by them, being utterly unable to form and execute new dispositions, as circumstances may require.

Besides the circumstances just mentioned, which *force an enemy* to contract his front, there is a method of extending yours, so that you may always out-flank him, though he be much superior in number. If you can *form on a portion of a circle*, whose branches project beyond his flanks, and the enemy persists in advancing within that circle, or remains in a line as usual, while you extend yours in a curve, so that you come on either, or both his flanks, it is evident that if you attack him in that disposition, he must be beat (*Plate 3.*) I therefore propose that your army be divided always in five parts, three placed in the centre, one fifth on the right, the remaining fifth on the left, and each advanced more or less, as the nature of the ground permits. They must

must not be behind the enemy, and liable to be cut off, as happened to the Prussians at Maxen, unless the whole of your army is opposed to the enemy's flank; then indeed you may place one or both corps nearly behind him, if the ground is advantageous. They must, however, wherever posted, have some certain and secure retreat, otherwise you expose them to great risk, and perhaps to utter ruin and destruction.

The advantages arising from this distribution of the troops are many. First, In whatever ground you act it is equally applicable. Secondly, The motions of the whole army are more simple and quicker. Thirdly, The enemy can make no manœuvres without your knowledge. Fourthly, Whether he advances to the right or left, (for he cannot, without exposing his army to the most imminent danger, advance against your centre,) your corps which he is attacking may fall back, or be supported by the centre, while the other attacks the flank opposite to

to it. If the enemy keeps his ground and waits your attack, then you act against both his flanks at the same time; or by lengthening your line to the right or left, enclose his flank while you attack his front. In short, while you can force him to attack within a portion of a circle, the victory is yours. This method, I repeat it, is general, equally proper for all cases; but more particularly advantageous, and even necessary for a defensive war.

Every army acts upon two lines, that on which it stands, and that which is drawn from the post it occupies, to the province it means to cover, or the places from whence it draws its subsistences. An army acting offensively, departs from a given point where its *dépôts* are lodged, and goes to a given point in the enemy's country. It is often and indeed generally adviseable for those on the defensive to avoid a battle; because the consequences are, or may be fatal. But it does not follow that you are to remain inactive :

inactive: what is then to be done? The answer is obvious. The centre must occupy some advantageous post, strongly fortified, while the two corps or wings must act day and night on the enemy's line of operation. If this is executed with vigour, he will soon be reduced to the necessity of attacking your centre, which you may avoid by taking a new position, and gain time or wait for it, while the two wings attack his flanks during the action; or else he must fall back to be nearer his *dépôts*, or finally send strong corps against yours; and as these retire not on your army, he loses his time and labour. By this disposition of your troops you cover your country effectually, and prevent the enemy from advancing towards your centre. The further he advances the more danger he runs; for his line of operation will be the longer and the less easy to be guarded. If, on the contrary, you act offensively, the enemy may find a thousand strong camps, from whence

whence you cannot force him by any attack on his front; but if you act by corps, as I propose, and direct your march on either flank, which enables you to act on his line of operation, you will in a few days force him to abandon his camp, and fight you on your own terms, or abandon the country. If he permits you to approach him, you may not only force him to abandon the country, but oblige him to retire in a given direction. I do not therefore understand a General where he says, the enemy was posted in such a manner that he could not be forced. I admit it could not perhaps be done by attacking his front; but unless his subsistence grows under his feet, he may be forced to abandon any camp, if you act on his flanks and line of operation, which he cannot prevent but by taking another position.

The march of an army is justly considered as one of the most capital operations in the art of war; I shall therefore

fore beg leave to point out the principles on which it is to be formed.

First, That it be executed in the least time possible.

Secondly, That the columns may be formed into a line with the greatest facility.

It follows from hence, that if the whole line, or lines, could march in front from one camp to another, this would be the most perfect way of marching, because no time would be lost in forming the columns for the march, or in replacing them in a line. Every officer will conceive that I mean a common march, when you advance in front towards the enemy ; for if you move on his flanks, you have nothing to do but to make the army, as it stands in two or three lines, march on its right or left ; then you are in order of battle, by a simple movement to the right or left, on the ground where you stand.

stand. But as no country is sufficiently open for an army to advance in a line, for any considerable distance, you must of course break that line, and march in several columns. The more numerous these columns are, the better for the reasons above-mentioned. The worst of all consequently is, that when you can march in one column only, because it supposes that the whole army is in a defile, and exposed to be cut in pieces by very few men, who occupy the ground through which such a column is passing. This must be the case with the French, if they attempt to penetrate into this country, as appears from the description we have given of it.

C H A P. VIII.

Tables of Distances.

I

The

The MILITARY ROADS from PLYMOUTH to LONDON,
forming a junction at EXETER and at SALISBURY.

Dist. in Miles.			Dist. in Miles.		
PLYMOUTH	betw. places	from Plym.	PLYMOUTH to	betw. places	from Plym.
To Ridgeway	5 $\frac{1}{4}$	5 $\frac{3}{4}$			
Lemin Bridge	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	7 $\frac{3}{4}$			
Woodland	2 $\frac{1}{4}$	10			
Ivy Bridge	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	Ivy Bridge to		
Wrangalin	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	15	Winton	5 $\frac{3}{4}$	17 $\frac{1}{4}$
Brent	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	16	Totnefs	4 $\frac{1}{4}$	21 $\frac{1}{2}$
Harburton	2 $\frac{3}{4}$	19	Newton Busbel	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	33
Dean	2 $\frac{3}{4}$	21 $\frac{3}{4}$	Red Lyon	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	35 $\frac{1}{2}$
Buckford	$\frac{1}{4}$	22	HALL DOWN	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	42
Afbburton	3	25	Kenford	2	44
Beckington	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	28 $\frac{1}{4}$	Alphington	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	46
Chudleigh	5	33 $\frac{1}{4}$	Exeter	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	48
Stillingford	7 $\frac{3}{4}$	41			
Exeter	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	Exeter to		
Honiton Clyft	4	47	Heavy Tree	1	44 $\frac{1}{2}$
Rochbere	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	49 $\frac{1}{2}$	Bifhops Clyft	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	48
Honiton Bridge	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	56	Newton Poplar	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	55 $\frac{1}{2}$
Honiton	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	59 $\frac{1}{2}$	Sidford	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	58
Offwell	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	63	Cullyford	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	65 $\frac{1}{2}$
Axminfter	6	69	Lyme	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	72
Ford	2	71	Shaderton	2	74
Street	4 $\frac{1}{4}$	75 $\frac{1}{4}$			
Crewkherne	6 $\frac{3}{4}$	82	Chidiock	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	78 $\frac{1}{2}$
Hafilbeer	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	84 $\frac{1}{2}$	Bridport	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	81
East Chirnock	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	87			
West Coker	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	88 $\frac{1}{2}$	Stapleton	10	91
Yeovil	3	91 $\frac{1}{2}$	Dorchester	5	96
Babylon Hill	1	92 $\frac{1}{2}$			
Sherborn	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	97	Piddle River	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	100 $\frac{1}{2}$
Milborn Port	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	99 $\frac{1}{2}$			
Stour West-over	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	106	Milford	4	104 $\frac{1}{2}$
Stour East-over	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	108 $\frac{1}{2}$			
Shaftesbury	4	112 $\frac{1}{2}$	Blandford	8	112 $\frac{1}{2}$
Ludwell	1	113 $\frac{1}{2}$			
White Street Hill	4	117 $\frac{1}{2}$	Woodgate's Inn	12 $\frac{3}{4}$	125 $\frac{1}{2}$
Fovent Hut	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	121			
Over the Plain by			Coombe	8	133 $\frac{1}{4}$
the Race Ground	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	126 $\frac{1}{2}$			
Mount Harman					
Hill	3	129 $\frac{1}{2}$			
Salisbury to	2 $\frac{1}{4}$	131 $\frac{3}{4}$	Salisbury to	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	136 $\frac{3}{4}$
LONDON	182	213 $\frac{3}{4}$	LONDON	82	218 $\frac{3}{4}$

MILITARY ROADS *from* PORTSMOUTH *to* LONDON; and
from DOVER *to* LONDON.

Dist. in Miles.			Dist. in Miles.		
PORTSMOUTH <i>to</i>	betw. places	from Portf.	DOVER <i>to</i>	betw. places	from Dover
Portsea Bridge	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	Buckland	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	
Cosham	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	5	Yowel Turnpike	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 $\frac{1}{4}$
PORTSDOWN	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	Lidden	2	4 $\frac{1}{4}$
Purbeck's Heath	2	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	Halfway House	3	7 $\frac{1}{4}$
Bere Forest	1	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	Barham Down	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	9 $\frac{3}{4}$
Horndean	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	11	Bridge	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	12
Petersfield	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	Canterbury	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	15 $\frac{1}{4}$
Sheet Bridge	1	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	Harble Down	1	16 $\frac{1}{4}$
Rake	3 $\frac{3}{4}$	23 $\frac{1}{4}$	Bleane Hill	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	19 $\frac{3}{4}$
Lippock	2 $\frac{3}{4}$	26	Boston Street	1	20 $\frac{3}{4}$
Over the Heath to			Ospring	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	24 $\frac{1}{4}$
Hind Head Hill.	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	31 $\frac{1}{4}$	Green Street	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$
Milford	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	37 $\frac{1}{2}$	Radfield Street	3 $\frac{3}{4}$	28 $\frac{3}{4}$
Godalming	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	39	Rapchild	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	29 $\frac{3}{4}$
Catharine Hill	3	42	Sittingbourn	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	31
Guildford	1	43	Key Street	2 $\frac{1}{4}$	33 $\frac{1}{4}$
Ripley	6	49	Newington Street	1	34 $\frac{1}{4}$
Cobham Street	4 $\frac{3}{4}$	53 $\frac{1}{4}$	Ranyham	3	37 $\frac{1}{4}$
Esher	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	56 $\frac{1}{2}$	Chatham and Ro-		
Thames Ditton	2	58 $\frac{1}{2}$	chester	3	40 $\frac{1}{4}$
Kingston	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	61	Stroud	2	42 $\frac{1}{4}$
LONDON.	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	73 $\frac{1}{2}$	Gads Hill	2	44 $\frac{1}{4}$
			Chalk Street	3	47 $\frac{1}{4}$
			Northfleet	3	50 $\frac{1}{4}$
			Dartford	5 $\frac{1}{4}$	55 $\frac{1}{2}$
			Crayford	1 $\frac{3}{4}$	57 $\frac{1}{4}$
			Wellen	3	60 $\frac{1}{4}$
			Shooter's Hill and		
			Woolwich	3	63
			Greenwich and		
			Deptford	3	66
			LONDON	5	71 $\frac{1}{4}$
			Deal to Canterbury	16	

Sea-port Towns and Villages along the CHANNEL COAST, between PLYMOUTH and DOVER, and between DOVER and MARGATE, with the Distances between each, by the Roads, &c. &c.

Counties. Towns and Villages. Dist. in Miles.

		betw. places	from Lond.
Devonshire	{ Plymouth		216
	{ Dartmouth	30	204
	{ Torbay	6	198
Dorsetshire	{ Teignmouth	9	183
	{ Exmouth	7	168
	{ Sidmouth	9	158
	{ Lyme	16	143
	{ Weymouth	24	129
	{ Poole	31	110
Hampshire	{ Christ Church	10	100
	{ Lymington	10	90
	{ Southampton	18	76
	{ Portsmouth	14	73
Suffex	{ Chichester	18	61
	{ Pagham	6	67
	{ Arundel	15	63
	{ Little Hampton	4	65
	{ Shoreham	15	56
	{ BRIGHTHELMSTONE	7	62
	{ Rotten Dean	4	55
	{ New Haven	5	56
	{ Seaford	4	59
	{ East Bourne	8	64
	{ Pevensey	5	60
	{ Hastings	12	64
Kent	{ Rye	8	63
	{ New Romney	16	71
	{ Hith	8	63
	{ Folkstone	4	72
	{ Dover	7	71
	{ Deal	10	72
	{ Sandwich	5	67
	{ Ramsgate	5	73
	{ Margate	5	72

A TABLE of the Distances by Sea between PLYMOUTH and HARWICH, &c. &c.

	Leagues.	Dist. by land in miles from Lond.
From Plymouth to		217
Portsmouth	50	73
Dover	40	71
Margate	8	70
Sheerness	9	40
Tilbury Fort	6½	20
Leigh	6	40
Malden	15	38
Landguard Fort and Harwich	19	58

A TABLE of the Distances between Sea-ports in FRANCE to Sea-ports in IRELAND and GREAT-BRITAIN.

	Leagues
From Brest to Galway	180
Corke	100
Plymouth	60
Torbay	70
Portsmouth	100
The Downs	132
Cherbourg to Portsmouth	26
Dieppe to Brighton	26
Haftings	22
Calais to Dover	7
Dunkirk to Ramsgate	15
Margate	17
Nore	25

Distances by Land between the principal Sea-ports on the French Coast, from BREST to DUNKIRK.

	Miles
From Brest to Morlaix	18
Treguier	15
St. Bricouc	15
St. Cas	12
St. Maloes	6
Granvilles	11
Cherbourg	26
by Sea { Harfleur	47
{ Havre	3
Dieppe	27
Abbeville	20
Boulogne	18
Calais	11
Gravellines	6
Dunkirk	4

PART II.

EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL LLOYD'S
MILITARY HISTORY RESPECTING
AN INVASION OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND OF FRANCE, AND THE PRIN-
CIPLES OF DEFENSIVE WAR.

CHAP. I.

*The difficulties a French army would en-
counter in advancing from Exeter to
London.*

WHEN we penetrate with our
great and very heavy armies into
an enemy's country, it is with a view to
conquer some provinces, fortresses, &c.
and finding nothing upon the road to sub-
sist upon, we have fixed and determined
points to lodge our stores and provisions,
from whence they are transported to the
army, which must proceed from these
given points to other fixed and determined
points

points in the enemy's country, if you carry on an offensive war ; or from a given point in your own towards another on the frontiers, if you are on the defensive. The line which unites these points, on which every army must act, is called the *line of operation*, and of all those we have mentioned, is the most important ; for, on the good or bad choice of this line, the final event of the war chiefly depends : if it is ill chosen, all your successes, however brilliant, will in the end be found useless. Let us illustrate this doctrine by an example : (an invasion of England from the side of Plymouth).

We will suppose an (enemy's) army of forty thousand foot, and ten thousand horse, besides those required for the train of artillery, bread waggons, officers horses, &c. which will amount to as many more. This army is at *Exeter*, and proposes to advance to *London*, and has its magazines all at Exeter. I have only thirty thousand men. I encamp as

near Exeter as I can ; and by occupying advantageous posts, I will force him to employ a fortnight in marching to Dorchester or Blandford. Till then I oppose the enemy in front, with small parties only on his flanks ; but when he is arrived thirty or forty miles from Exeter, from which place alone he draws his subsistence ; instead of opposing him in front with all my forces, I place ten thousand on his line of march, ten on his left flank, and the remaining ten along his line of operation, which goes from his camp to his depots at Exeter. The last will be distributed in four or five corps along that line, and form a chain from one end to the other, so that a single waggon cannot pass unobserved, and consequently will be taken or attacked by some one or other of these parties. A hundred men will destroy as many waggons, by dispersing the drivers, taking away or killing the horses, breaking the carriages, &c. The enemy must, therefore, send a strong body of troops, ten thousand

thousand men, for example, to escort a great convoy. I then make a motion to the right with my whole army, so that my left comes across his left, my center and right go many miles beyond it. In whatever manner the escort is distributed, as part in the front, part in the center, and part in the rear of the convoy, I say that neither ten nor even twenty thousand can preserve it; because these are chained to their convoy, and cannot quit it, nor the station they occupy; whereas my troops can engage, and attack, how, when, and where they please: they can attack and amuse the escorts, in a pass or a wood, which of course obliges the whole to stop, while two or three thousand men, in small parties, attack the chain of wag-gons from one end to the other. If they succeed in some places only, the whole will soon be dispersed.

It would be adviseable to attack that part which proceeds at the head of the convoy, with the greatest part of your forces,

forces, if it goes ten or twelve miles from the camp ; because you may then cut it off entirely, and the whole convoy, and the remaining part of the escort, unless the enemy falls back immediately to assist them, which is no easy matter, as you have the centre and left of your army on his flanks, and rear in his retreat ; and most certainly he will arrive too late to prevent the ruin of his convoy, which is our object.

If instead of being only thirty or forty miles from Exeter, as we suppose, he is a hundred, at Salisbury for example ; I always suppose that all his provisions, without exception, come from thence, or from any where else, a hundred miles off. I say that such an enemy as we suppose cannot remain a fortnight in that camp, though the convoys meet with no other difficulties but such as arise from the length of the road, bad weather, accidents, &c.

I

It

It is impossible to collect and maintain a sufficient number of horses, carriages, &c. to supply an army of fifty or sixty thousand men, including those who follow the camp, with provisions, stores, forage, &c. and to supply the convoy, drivers, &c. in their journey to and from the camp two hundred miles we suppose, which cannot be performed in less than twenty days. I am so convinced myself of this, that if you place twenty thousand foot, and five thousand horse on any spot, so that they subsist only upon what is brought from one given point, a hundred miles off, they must in a week go and meet their convoy, disperse, or perish.

Now if to these natural and unsurmountable difficulties, you add those which an able leader can create, by acting on the principles we have established above, it will appear evident, beyond contradiction, that no army, great or small, can act in a line of operation of a hundred

dred miles, provided you can keep the field; of course you must avoid a general action.

The more the country is inclosed and intersected by woods, mountains, rivers, passes, &c. the more difficulties the enemy will meet with: the more cross roads the more advantageous for you; because they enable you to act on his line of operation. In such a country you may in almost every spot lay snares for his parties, even for his whole army, with success. Whoever weighs what we have said will be convinced that the ideas and fears of a (French) invasion were vain and absurd.

G——l L——d proceeds to inculcate the principles of defensive war.

If he (the invader) attacks you, he must immediately bring you to a general action, that he may be enabled to besiege some place of importance, form new depots, and advance further into the country,

try, until he forces you to abandon the whole, or make peace on the terms he prescribes : it is your part to avoid a general action ; for while you have an army in the field, and know how to manage it with advantage, he may, though much superior, be forced to abandon his project, and retire with a ruined army. Were you in condition to venture an engagement, with probable hopes of success, *you must not do it*, because if you are beat, the consequence may be fatal, and by conquering you only force him to retire, which you may do without any risk, if you adhere to what I shall say on the subject. When he drives you, retire gradually from one strong camp to another ; skirmish often, but never fight a battle.

A general should scarce ever fight, when on the defensive, but to preserve some important place, and to hinder the enemy from taking winter quarters in his country, or force him to abandon it, if he is in possession.

CHAP.

C H A P. II.

Reflections on the Invasion of the Metropolis of Great Britain, from the Side of France.

ON the coast of England there are *three harbours*, where a great fleet may ride with safety. The enemy must take one of them. Suppose it done, and that the English have not a ship left. *Suppose farther, that there is a French army of sixty thousand men encamped on Blackbeath, and off London bridge.*

I say there are two hundred thousand men in England who have bore arms. I will put the half on horseback, and the other half remains on foot: mix them as circumstances may require. Then I place fifty thousand men in Surry and Suffex, and as many in Essex, who act on the
 enemy's

enemy's line, which on that supposition must go towards the *Downs*; *there being no other place where his fleet can anchor.* Such a disposition being made, and only half the number of men we propose employed, I ask any officer, any man of sense, what will become of the enemy's army on Blackheath, or in any other given point, sixty or seventy miles from the coast? It must perish; for undoubtedly no army can subsist on a line of such length, as is that from France to Blackheath, over a branch of the sea, and penetrate into the country, while we have an army of thirty or forty thousand men only to oppose their supplies. No army can subsist in a country, unless it draws all, or the greatest part of its subsistence from the country itself, and of course possesses a great tract behind it, and on every side to the right and left: for if you can act on the enemy's line he must retire; and though he should be in possession of such a tract of country as we suppose, he cannot keep it, unless he is
master

master of one or more strong places, to enable him to separate his troops, and put them into winter quarters.

When the combined fleet (of France and Spain, 1779) appeared on our coast, the nation, unaccustomed to see an enemy so near, seemed much alarmed. I then thought it my duty to examine the possible results of an invasion, and pointed out the means of defeating it, determined and fixed the lines on which the enemy must have acted, had he landed, and the different positions the English army must have occupied on such lines, to prevent him from advancing into the country, or keeping the post he had taken on our coast. When I consider this subject in a military light only, I wished almost that the enemy had made such an attempt; because once for all they would have seen the absurdity, and danger of it, and we should for ever have been cured of our fears.

The

The Russians and Austrians in 1760, far from being able to keep Berlin, were extremely happy, after two days stay, to get away, though they had, undoubtedly, fifty thousand men. This must always be the case if you attack an enemy in the centre of his dominions: whence it follows, that you must begin at one or other of the extreme provinces.

Here we think proper to insert a precaution respecting the attack, and security of magazines and depots.—It was resolved by the King of Prussia (during the late war) to send a corps into Poland, to destroy the enemy's magazines, which lay scattered over the country, before the front of the Russians, in small defenceless towns and villages, guarded by only parties of twenty or thirty men; contrary to all rules of prudence, which require that no depot whatever should be placed before the front, or in defenceless towns. They must always be be-

K hind

hind the army, or in the flanks, in towns, and well defended : for an army cannot, like a traveller, find inns on the road to refresh and nourish at.

C H A P. III.

Reflections on the Invasion of the Coast of France from Great Britain; and from the different Sides of the Continent.

HAVING described the frontiers of the principal European powers on the Continent, we must now return to consider *that of France on the British channel*. This frontier extends from Dunkirk to Ushant, and round that point along the Bay of Biscay, to Bayonne: in this line however there is but *one harbour*, where a great fleet can be built, equipped, and ride in safety, which is *Brest*. Ships of the line are also built at Rochfort, and equipped there; but few in number, and only few can be kept there in safety: they soon perish, because the water is sweet, though the tide runs very high and violent up the Charante.

In speaking of the line of operation, on which an army acts, we have laid it down as an axiom, not to be controverted, that if it is of any considerable length, or intersected by mountains, passes, rivers, and of course, if it goes over a considerable branch of the sea, no solid enterprize can be executed on such line, though your forces are much superior to those who oppose you. A pirate may land twenty men on the coast of France, or any other, rob a hen-roost, burn a few houses, and run away to their ship, in spite of France, and its two hundred thousand men, because such an expedition is executed in a few hours.

In the late war, England, at a prodigious expence, made several attempts on the coasts of France; the result was burning some fishing boats, and by accident, I believe, some houses, and were happy to come off. Their last exploit at St. Cas was, we know, very unfortunate. Whose fault was it? No doubt it was the
fault

fault of those who planned those fine expeditions. Could we have burnt the enemy's docks, stores, &c. at *Brest and Rochfort*, it would have been of great importance, and worth trying: but every other object was by no means equal to the risk or the expence, and never ought to be undertaken. No forces the English can bring on the coast will be sufficient to take Brest, or any other capital place. But for a moment I will suppose the French are asleep; that the English fleet and fifty thousand men are at Brest. What then? Why they must, in a short time, return home, if they can: for surely they cannot remain at Brest, which in a short time will be surrounded by a French army, who will besiege you in it: you must therefore abandon it, or advance into the country: advance in the name of God! You are at Rennes, the capital of Britany. What then, I ask once more? Why, you will be surrounded, your communication with Brest and

your fleet cut off, and your army perishes by the sword, or by famine.

What I say of Brest, which indeed is the only place on the coast where a fleet can for any considerable time ride with safety, is equally applicable to every other point on this coast, or any other coast whatever; if your army meets with any, though very inconsiderable resistance. For while your enemy can keep the field, and act on your flanks, you cannot remain on any given spot; and if you advance, you only precipitate your ruin.

The frontier of France, towards Germany, begins at Basil in Switzerland, and runs in various directions from thence to Dunkirk, in French Flanders. I shall divide this long line into three parts, and consider each of them separately. The first part goes from Basil to Landau, and covers Alsatia; it is near 130 miles in length. The second part goes from Landau to Sedan, on the Moselle, covers
Lorraine

Lorrain on the side of the Electorate of Treves, the Dutchies of Deux Ponts, Luxemburg, and Limburg; it is 190 miles in length. From Sedan down the Meuse, to Charlemont in French Flanders, and thence to Dunkirk, goes the third part, and is about 150 miles; so that this whole frontier is about 470 miles.

The first part of this line is covered by the Rhine, on which are placed Hunninghen, New Brisac, Straßburg, and Landau; all which are very strong. Straßburg has a bridge over the Rhine; on the back part of Alsace runs a chain of mountains, which separates it from Franche Compté and Lorrain; the distance between these mountains is from ten to fifteen miles. An army encamped near Straßburg, covered by the Rhine, and the fortresses above-mentioned, could, with ease, prevent an enemy from passing that river, or at least from besieging any of them; and without taking them all,

he could not possibly separate his army, and take his winter quarters in Alsace, while the French have any considerable force encamped or cantoned in the mountains above-mentioned. I am therefore surprized the Austrians ever made an attempt on that side, and much more so, that the French were so very much alarmed at it. For my part, I am confident that an able general, at the head of thirty or forty thousand men, so far from being terrified at the approach of an enemy, or opposing his passing the Rhine, would wish to see him shut up between the mountains, the river, and the fortresses; because he would see the facility of preventing his repassing it at all, and of cutting him off entirely. Look at the map and judge.

The second part of the French frontier, viz. the line which goes from Landau to Sedan, is very strong both by nature and art, having several strong places on it; and the country before it no less difficult,
being

being very mountainous, and consequently full of narrow passes. The direction of this line is concave towards that part of Germany; so that an enemy who advances on that side must have his depots on the Rhine, at Monts, or Coblenz, or at Maestricht and Namur on the Meuse; in both cases the army, which I suppose encamped at Landau, can hinder him from advancing from the Rhine, by acting on his line of operation on that side, while another of forty thousand men, placed on the Meuse, near Sedan, will prevent any army from advancing into Lorraine, or Champagne on that side, as is evident from the inspection of the map.

Whether we consider the strength of this line, the direction of it, or finally, the obstacles which the country before it offers, it will appear that no enemy can approach it, much less attack it with any prospect of success. A small corps posted at Luxemburg might indeed advance from
thence,

thence, and ravage a few villages in haste, but no solid enterprize can, we think, ever be executed on that side.

The third and last part of the French frontier runs from Sedan down the Meuse to Charlemont, from thence to Dunkirk, and is 150 miles in length. It has been the scene of successive wars for near two centuries, the most expensive, bloody, and durable of any recorded in the annals of mankind; of which the author proposes giving the history on the same plan this work is wrote.

This line is stronger by art than nature, having a prodigious number of strong fortresses and posts upon it; moreover, it projects in many places, so that an enemy can enter it no where, without having some of them in front, and on his flanks; his depots must be at Namur, Mons, and Tournay. An army of forty thousand men placed on the Sambre, and another of equal force about Condé, will so bridle

his operations, that he cannot advance a step without imminent danger : for that army which we suppose on the Sambre, by masking Namur, penetrates into the country to Brussels, &c. which will force the enemy to retire, and abandon his own frontier. In the present state of Austrian Flanders, and the adjacent parts of Holland, nothing could prevent the two armies from over-running the above-mentioned countries in one campaign.

In the war for the succession of Spain, at the beginning of the century, ten successful campaigns brought the allies no farther than Landrecy, not thirty miles from the Austrian frontiers ; a very inconsiderable defeat at Donain obliged Prince Eugene to raise the siege of that place, and in a short time abandon his conquests, the fruits of many victories.

I know most people suppose, that this was owing to the defection of the English : had this never taken place, perhaps
the

the Allies might in time have advanced to the Marne, and sent parties to the Soyne: but will any officer suppose, that an army marching that line from Mons, Tournay, &c. could separate and take winter quarters on the above-mentioned rivers, while the French were in possession of Picardy, Normandy, and Champagne? No, it is impossible: the great fault of the French generals, when on the defensive, was to oppose the enemy in front, whereas they should have operated against their flanks.

The final event of this long and bloody war shows the strength of this frontier, and the prodigious resources of the House of Bourbon.

From the description we have now given of the French frontier, towards Germany and Flanders, though very incomplete, it appears that an enemy, though his dominions were on the Upper Rhine, opposite to Alsace, would find

find it extremely difficult, or rather impossible, to conquer that province, from whence alone he could penetrate into Lorrain, &c.

That the second part of the French frontier, from Landau to the Meuse, cannot be attacked by any German power marching up the Moselle, between the Rhine and the Meuse, the event of the different wars, waged in Flanders, prove the superiority of the French; I mean the superior advantages they possess in acting on that frontier, which are indeed so very great, that no forces can be collected and supported in Flanders by the House of Austria, the English, Dutch, or the German Princes, which can preserve that country against the efforts of the French: most certainly the Austrians alone cannot do it.

The French frontiers, towards Switzerland, Savoy, and Spain, are too strong
to

to be invaded by those powers. The idea of passing the Var, and conquering Provence, is too ridiculous to deserve a serious discussion.

THE


W A

BRISTOL CHANN

Lundy I.

Hartland P.

DEVON SHIRE



T H E



C H A N

A MILITARY SKETCH OF THE LINE TO DEFEND,
from PLYMOUTH to DOVER.

British Miles.

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60



N

E



EAST

L

GENERAL FACE OF THE

ON THE WESTERN


Chiefly between Plymouth

Engraved by W^m F

INCLOSED

COUNTRY

the Enemy



F THE COUNTRY


ERN ROADS,

outh and Exeter.

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MOUNTAINOUS



COUNTRY



The PIKE and the PIKEMEN.


1 Foot
2 Inch

Note
The men
have been
drawn at
a greater
distance
than they
ought to be,
in order to
shew more
clearly their
respective
attitudes




44
Batt ons
armed
with
Pikes

The Army formed in a portion of a Circle



The Army formed in a Line, with Redoubts and Epaulements in Front, and Battalions armed with Pikes on the Flanks.



THE
SUPPLEMENT,
AND
PART III.

CHAP. I.

*A Sketch of the successive Invasions of
Great Britain, by the Romans, the
Saxons, the Danes, the Normans.*

THERE are no civilized nations on
our globe, which have not, at one
period or other, been over-run by invaders.
If the Northern nations have been less ha-
rassed with these hurricanes of human a-
varice and ambition, they are more indebted
to nautical and geographical ignorance,
and to their uninviting situation and po-
verty,

verty, than to their prowess or martial pre-eminence. How long the Phœnicians had exported tin from the South of Britain, before the arrival of the Romans, is, I believe, a chronological problem, and as yet unsettled.

Julius Cæsar provoked, as he pretended, at the assistance given by the Britains to their neighbours the Gauls, embarked with his victorious legions from the opposite coast of France, and landed, A. C. 54, in Kent, on the banks of the river Stour, a few miles to the north of Dover. The success of a powerful and martial nation, habituated, during the space of seven hundred years, to military discipline and victory, may easily be anticipated, when opposed by a banditti of naked but resolute savages. The military weapons of the Britains consisted principally of spears and shields, and like the ancient Greeks and Romans, they combated alternately in chariots and on foot. Internal dissension rendered them still more unequal
to

to resistance and concert. Their island was divided into a rabble of twenty-eight petty states and dominations; the slaves of Kings and of Druids, who were priests, prophets, and judges.

Whether from the difficulty of access, or the insignificance of the object in those days, the Romans contented themselves with the subjugation of the southern part of Britain. This, however, was upwards of a century contested with them, in many bloody encounters, by the natives, conducted by their celebrated leaders Cassivelaun, Caractacus, Boadicea, Arviragus, Galgacus, &c. To repel the incursions of the Northern Picts and Scots, the Roman emperors and generals erected a chain of forts across the narrow parts of the island, extending from the German ocean to the Irish channel; one of them between the Firth of Forth and the Clyde, the other between the Tyne and the Firth of Solway. The last was eighty miles in length, and consisted of

L a strong

a strong rampart and ditch, with forts and towers interspersed. More effectually to facilitate and secure their conquest, the Romans made four longitudinal and transverse roads, diverging in opposite directions from London; one of them extending through York, and one to Dover.

From the arrival of the Romans in Britain, to their departure, fills a space of about five hundred years. During that interval, they had greatly depopulated the island in the recruit of their armies, and were under the necessity of finally abandoning it, and of recalling their legions for domestic defence.

The departure of these celebrated and enlightened conquerors, and the overthrow of their Western empire, was a calamity which Britain, equally with the rest of Europe, had reason to deplore. The imperial feat of arms and arts was soon after supplanted by ignorance and super-

superstition. The Romans first introduced stones and bricks into the British architecture. Until then, the natives were lodged in wretched wooden hovels, collected together in forests, surrounded with ditches and ramparts, and dignified with the appellation of towns. The principal Roman stations were, London, St. Albans, Malden, Dover, York, Chester, and others of inferior note.

During several successive centuries, after the downfall of Rome, and the deluge of Northern barbarians, the greatest part of Europe continued plunged in anarchy and ignorance. In the eighth century a similar inundation of ravage and ruin was spread, by Mahomet and the Arabians, over a large portion of Africa and Asia. Britain was a sharer in this general calamity, and chaos of mankind.

Six centuries of the British history, after their emancipation from the Roman yoke, is filled with a frightful catalogue

of defensive warfare against the Saxons, Danes, and Normans. The island, as before observed, had been stripped of its vigorous youth, and left in a state of debility by the Romans. To this abdication of military tyrants succeeded civil dissensions, anarchy, and famine, with predatory incursions of the Picts, Scots, and Irish. These complicated calamities urged the distracted natives to implore assistance from the Northern parts of Europe, from those military free-booters, the Saxons, Jutes, and Angles, who, under Hengist and Horsa, landed P. C. 450, on the isle of Thanet, some miles north of Dover Straits.

By subsequent intermarriages, by the aid of Picts and Scots, by a successive influx of succours from the Continent, and by a long series of wars, of barbarous ferocity and massacres, the southern part of Britain, called England, became gradually partitioned into seven independent states. In these violent scenes of warfare,

fare, and exertions of national valour against foreign invaders, which continued to rage during one century and a half, Vortimer, Pendragon, Arthur, Cadwallo, and Cadwallador, are enumerated amongst the distinguished princes and heroes of Britain.

The Saxon heptarchy, as might naturally be expected, was not of long duration. Its jarring members, after exhausting themselves in mutual carnage and depredation, were by degrees consolidated into one monarchy. This union of the mutinous rivals was effected principally under Egbert and Alfred. The latter is commonly reputed not only the founder of the English monarchy, but likewise of the first English university, Oxford, and of a more regular system of legislation, into which was incorporated the meritorious customs and common law of the Saxons. Britain might then be compared to a shattered hulk in a raging ocean, and had not time to repair its da-

rages before another hurricane, still more furious, was ready to overwhelm it.

In the ninth century swarms of Northern pirates from the borders of the Baltic, composed of Danes, Jutes, Norwegians, and Swedes, began to infest the coasts of England, Ireland, and Normandy, which they long kept in terror and alarm. Alfred fought in one year eight battles with them, and in his whole reign fifty-six land and naval actions. Throughout the ninth and tenth centuries these infernal confederates, in rapine and murder, made irruptions, with a numerous naval and land force, by almost every river and creek of England, between Northumberland and Cornwall. By inflexible perseverance, and a continual succession of re-inforcements, by treachery, disunion, and faction amongst the English nobility, these vagrant robbers and fiends established themselves in England, and three Danish Kings successively domineered over that turbulent monarchy.

It

It was the misfortune of England to become once more a prey to foreign invaders. About the middle of the eleventh century, Harold, by surprize, faction, and audacity, and without proximate pretensions of birth, had seated himself on the English throne, and had, at the same time, to contend against a fresh irruption of barbarians from the Baltic, and against domestic insurrections, when William, Duke of Normandy, laid claim to the English sceptre. William was a descendant of those Danish pirates, who, a century earlier, had spread themselves over Normandy, and into the Mediterranean, as far as Naples and Sicily. Although of spurious and mean descent by his mother's side, William was related by blood to the legitimate Kings of England, and had been formally adopted, in preference to Harold, by Edward the Confessor, the great patron of the Normans, and the first Justinian of England. At this period, these foreigners had attained to an exalted character in the

English church and state, and most of the bishops were William's countrymen.

With these important advantages in his favour, and the Papal benediction on his expedition, William embarked with a fleet of 3000 ships, and 60,000 disciplined troops, the flower of all the warriors of the Continent, conducted by a martial nobility, incited by military emulation, and by the proposed spoils of England. This formidable army landed, P. C. 1066, at Pevensey, in Suffex, in the vicinity of Hastings, and a few miles to the north of Beachy-head. Immediately before their arrival, the Danes had been stirred up to annoy England; they had debarked in the Humber, Harold had just defeated them, with great slaughter, when news reached him of William's actual descent in Suffex.

Errors, which in the ordinary occurrences of life admit of excuse and remedy, are in war frequently irreparable and fatal.

Harold's

Harold's plan of operations was rash and injudicious. His army was weakened by the recent encounter with the Danes, and by the disunion of its leaders; he, notwithstanding, rushed, with impetuous eagerness, to a general engagement with the Norman invader. After a long and desperate conflict near Hastings, William's discipline and generalship prevailed, and Harold, with almost his whole army, were left amongst the slain.

William, though victorious, judged it prudent to turn aside, and to attack Dover, so as to secure his retreat in case of adversity, and as a landing place and depot for fresh supplies. It contributed not a little to his future success, that the strong garrison of this ancient key of England, and natural fortification, immediately surrendered. But notwithstanding this career of victory, the inhabitants of Kent continued intrepid and unsubdued. They bristled in armour and defiance to oppose the invader, and unanimously gave him choice of immediate

mediate battle, or a confirmation of being governed by their ancient laws. With these favourable terms the subtle tyrant was glad to feign compliance, and soon after, by the influence of the clergy, the whole nation peaceably acquiesced in the change of Kings. Indeed the English had been early accustomed to the deposition and change of their monarchs ; and in many subsequent reigns the lineal succession was trampled upon, and decided by the sword.

Happily for Britain, this is the last successful effort of foreign usurpation. Never was conquest more complete and humiliating, nor King more absolute, than this spurious Norman. With him the feudal system was introduced, in tyrannic pomp, into England, and the people became alternately oppressed with monarchical tyranny, or imperious aristocracy. He degraded and proscribed all the ancient nobility of England, and confiscated their estates, in order to provide
for

for his military followers. During several generations after, no Briton nor Saxon was promoted to offices of rank or trust. He laid waste many towns and villages in Hampshire, to make a forest for game and deer, which were guarded with distinct and sanguinary laws; and the hunting and shooting of which was then the principal amusement of an illiterate nobility.

In these long and ferocious struggles against a foreign yoke, the race of ancient natives was nearly exhausted. The fortresses of Wales were the principal asylums of the surviving wreck; and even at this day the descendants of those Britains seem almost a distinct nation.

CHAP.

C H A P. II.

Of the Crusades against France, and against the Infidels in Palestine. The Incorporation of Ireland, Wales, and Scotland, with the English Monarchy. Cursory reflections on the Constitution and Policy of England during the last 700 Years. Of the modern and remote Acquisitions to the British Empire. The comparative Growth of France.

AFTER the Norman invasion, a considerable portion of the seven following centuries of the British history, at least so far as it relates to our subject, is filled up with a turbulent narrative of crusades against France; with religious crusades against the infidels in Palestine; with various acquisitions of internal and external strength; with domestic factions, plots, conspiracies, and executions; with papal and clerical usurpation, imposture, bigotry,

bigotry, and fanaticism; and from the rude state of agriculture and medicine, with frequent visitations of famine and pestilence.

In the Norman invasion, and the unprofitable appendages in France thereby added to the English monarchy, we may trace the first seeds of those fatal animosities and bloody contests, which have continued to waste their respective subjects and treasures during a series of seven hundred years. In Edward the Third's reign, and fourteenth century, those national prejudices and jealousies were rekindled with fresh fuel and conflagration. From this reign down to the end of Henry the Fifth, who was crowned at Paris, the English continued throughout one entire century, to acquire the ascendent, and to maintain their dominion over many provinces in France.

It is also worthy of remark, that during this victorious career of England, when

she conquered many western and southern provinces in France, and held her principal sea ports on the channel coast, when Crecy, Poitiers, and Agincourt, were amongst the catalogue of her trophies, that she was not only unsupported by Scotland, but had, at the same time, to defend herself against that brave northern neighbour, whose imperious nobles were pensioners and partizans of France. England might then be said to combat France with her right hand, and Scotland with her left. After Henry the Fifth's brilliant reign, we may date the declension of the English power over France. This retrograde change of fortune was not a little promoted by the latter declining to risk any general action: a wise maxim taught them by dear bought experience, and which in the end preserved them from ruin. About one century after, that is, about the middle of the sixteenth, in Mary's odious reign, the surprise and capture of Calais emancipated France from the usurpation and intrusion of Britain, which

which she had been compelled to submit to during five hundred years.

Calais, whose memorable siege, two hundred years before, had occupied Edward the Third eleven months, was now by stratagem taken in eight days. It had been an annual expence to the crown of England of 19000*l.* which was then one-third of the charge of government in time of peace. It was of no use to the defence of England, except perhaps as a military school, and as a convenient door and access into France; and probably Havre de Grace at the mouth of the Seine would have been a more important station.

On the other hand we may remark, that there are no instances in this whole interval of five centuries, after the Norman invasion, wherein France ventured to set foot in England, except once, by the express invitation of the English nobles, and mandatory anathemas of the Pope,

Pope, during the turbulent reign of John, once during the unfortunate reign of Henry VI. and once in an unsuccessful expedition against the Isle of Wight, in the reign of Henry VIII.

The Romans acted with far superior policy and judgment to the English, in not venturing upon any foreign invasion before they had reduced all Italy under their dominion. They spent five centuries of incessant domestic war in laying the foundations and platforms of their internal strength and solidity, before they embarked in the conquest of the adjacent small island of Sicily.

England, on the contrary, was hurried, with premature and fruitless ambition, into wars against France, and into religious crusades against the infidels of Palestine. In this epidemical fanaticism, the English acted a conspicuous part, and some of their monarchs were at least signalized for exploits of valour. From these

these frantic expeditions to Asia, the spirit of romance, chivalry, and tournament, was ushered into England, and continued down to the last century a predominant passion and pastime. This spirit of Quixotism, which, in some respects, resembled the heroic and early ages of Greece, in its collateral effects, contributed essentially to introduce civilization and liberty, together with Arabian literature, and their translations of the Greek and Roman fragments; and it atoned, in a great degree, for the importation of that foreign leprous scurf with which Europe was, for many generations after, inundated.

During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, two domestic acquisitions, of immense moment in their future consequences, were made to the English crown and strength; and two centuries later, a third and precious diadem was added to these. The reader will perceive that I allude to Ireland, Wales, and Scotland.

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The Irish, like the English, had smarted under the invasion of the Northern pirates from the Baltic. After these, Henry II. 1172, was invited by some of the discontented princes of Ireland to invade that island, which was then sunk in extreme ignorance, barbarism, and poverty, and distracted with public discord. Similar motives had induced the English to invite the Saxons into Britain; and in both instances the auxiliaries became masters. There were then three principal sovereignties in Ireland, besides many small independent states, tribes, and clans, who, like all hords of barbarians, were constantly exercising rapine and violence against each other. In consequence of these civil dissensions, and probably an inferiority in military tactics and discipline, Ireland seems to have submitted almost without resistance, to a handful of private adventurers from England. Dermot, King of Leinster, gave his daughter in marriage to one of the leaders of this expedition; and this submission was soon after

after more generally acquiesced in, and ratified to Henry in person, who, besides the English monarchy, held extensive, hereditary, and acquired possessions in France.

Edward the First was assisted by both the Irish and the Welch in his conquest of Scotland; and Edward the Third had six thousand Irish in his army at the battle of Crecy in France. The vassalage, however, of Ireland to England was long merely nominal, and even unprofitable to the invaders. During five centuries after the 2d Henry, the Irish remained savage, untractable, and rebellious; and scarce a reign elapsed without an insurrection in that island. In many of these instances, however, the Irish were the stupid instruments of a faction in England. Hume observes, “ that the horrible and absurd
“ oppressions which the Irish suffered
“ during many centuries, under the Eng-
“ lish government, had fired them with
“ indignation and the spirit of resistance.

“ From this ill-judged policy, the native
 “ Irish were treated as beasts, and became
 “ such. They were often excluded from
 “ law, justice, and protection, and joined
 “ the rancour of revenge to untamed bar-
 “ barity.” Henry the Eighth, about
 three centuries ago, was the first who
 added the title of King of Ireland to the
 other English titles of sovereignty. But
 it was not until the latter end of Eliza-
 beth’s reign, that this fertile island was re-
 duced into legal subordination ; nor until
 that of her successor, James the First,
 that it gave hopes of being an useful ac-
 quisition to the English nation. Eliza-
 beth founded a sumptuous University at
 Dublin ; and James the First, with meri-
 torious sagacity, contributed to its civi-
 lization, by the introduction of English
 laws, agriculture, and arts, together
 with colonies of Protestant subjects from
 the south and north of Britain.

The infamous confederacy of the na-
 tive Irish, in the massacre of forty thou-
 sand

sand of these colonists, during the civil wars of Charles the First, originated from papal bigotry, intrigues, fanaticism, and oppression, and their apprehensions of total extermination. The English had been exasperated, by mal-treatment, to act the same vindictive tragedy against both the Romans and the Danes. Afterwards, under the triumphant usurper and tyrant, Cromwell, most of their lands were wantonly portioned out to the English, who advanced money to his parliament, some amongst his soldiers in lieu of arrears, and some sold to the rich corporation of London. In truth, until the present century, Ireland was governed by a spirit of rank folly, ignorance, and tyranny, to which nations, as well as individuals, are too prone. In the wild projects and prejudices of the English monarchs for conquering France, they had neglected infinitely more useful occupations of domestic union and improvement; an error which, in substance, though not in form, has continued, down to the present day, to infect

the British cabinet ; and is one, amongst many other proofs, that habit, more reason, governs mankind and statesmen.

Wales, until the first Edward's reign, had been, in a great measure, defended by its inaccessible mountains and defiles against the Saxon, Danish, and Norman invaders. It had, throughout many ages, remained a distinct and independent principality of the ancient Britons, and had frequently molested the English borders with predatory incursions. But after various struggles against Edward the First, it was finally incorporated, 1272, with the English monarchy, accepting as its nominal prince, the heir apparent of the English throne.

The Scotch history is a doleful repetition of predatory warfare and domestic faction. Throughout almost every reign, from the Norman invasion to the sixteenth century, the Scotch had infested the English frontiers with rapine and devastation.

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The Northern and Southern inhabitants of the same island were incessantly occupied, like ferocious savages, in tearing each other to pieces. They might be compared to two nations of rival gladiators, who made fighting their amusement and trade. The Scotch King and Parliament, as well as the Irish Chieftains, had been forced to do homage to Henry the Second. In the thirteenth century, Edward the First again reduced Scotland under the English subjection; and it was re-conquered by Edward the Third: but in all these instances, it found means soon after to revolt, and to shake off the yoke. Scotland, in its resistance against English encroachments, had pre-eminent advantages over Ireland, by being combined into one monarchy; and afterwards in being assisted by France, with whom she was long united in an offensive and defensive league. Without this extraneous assistance, Scotland could never have so long maintained her barbarous independence against her more powerful neighbour.

bour. After Edward the Third's time, a war with France generally produced hostilities with Scotland, and invasion of the English frontiers.

So late as Elizabeth's reign, in the sixteenth century, the Scotch had very little to boast of their attainments in law or order, in arts or commerce. Their ruling constitution consisted, in fact, of an ignorant and turbulent aristocracy, and belligerent clans of submissive vassals. It was of little consequence to them how their laws were framed, while their exorbitant aristocracy had it so much in their power to prevent their execution. The beginning of the seventeenth century, when the union of the crowns of Scotland and England commenced, in the person of James the First, forms a most important and happy epoch to both the Northern and Southern inhabitants of Britain. It was indeed time for those shocking scenes, which pollute every page of the British history, to terminate, and by which
more

more than one million of lives were sacrificed. Lastly, the union of the two Parliaments, at the beginning of the present century under Queen Anne, drew into a focus the united strength and resources of the whole island. Until this complete assimilation and coalescence with England, the government of Scotland had, from the beginning, been exposed to incessant sedition and convulsion; and after groaning for ages under a factious nobility, it was, in the last century, infected and debased by a dismal fanaticism.

Let us next examine, with all possible brevity, whether England, in this period, was a pattern of moderation, wisdom, and liberty to her neighbours, and to the additional members of her empire. Some reigns after the Norman invasion, the kings of England were more absolute than those of France, who were kept in subjection by a powerful and mutinous aristocracy. In the twelfth century the regal scale sunk in England, and aristocracy

cracy reached its summit. The confederacy of a few powerful barons was then capable of shaking the throne. Between these contests of king and barons, and of pope and clergy, England was long agitated, and plunged headlong from the extremities of one faction into another. The feudal system was every where productive of discord and civil war. The great Charter, extorted from John in the thirteenth century, and other old statutes and privileges were all sufficiently clear in favour of liberty, but they were incessantly violated. Voltaire, however ironically, might with truth say that some centuries of the British history should be written by the hangman. It is notorious, that in the contentions for the throne, between the York and Lancaster factions, the greatest part of the ancient nobility of England were exterminated in the field, or on scaffolds. These long and bloody wars, which continued throughout six reigns, from Henry IV. to Henry VII. were at length healed up by the union of the contending

tending families. But other disgusting and abominable scenes of domestic calamity were impending.

By the Reformation, a torch of religious discord and persecution was kindled throughout Europe. During the Saxon Heptarchy, the Christian system of religion which had been imported from Italy into England, before the departure of the Romans, was finally established, and had supplanted the gross superstition and idolatry of the Saxon oracle Woden. After the Norman invasion, England was, for many centuries, the most superstitious of all the remote provinces under the papal hierarchy. Crusades, and intrigues with the court of Rome, continued throughout many ages the principal occupation and policy of European courts. But, about four hundred years ago, J. Wickliffe, a priest bred at Oxford, the founder of the sect called Lollards, founded the alarm of clerical imposture and usurpation throughout Europe. This reprehension of papal
arrogance,

arrogance, both in theory and practice, was revived with more asperity by Luther and Calvin; and soon after the dismemberment of the English church from the Roman pontiff was effected under a bigotted and tyrannic monarch Henry VIII. By this great event, and by the revival and diffusion of literature, a general spirit of resistance and reformation, both civil and religious, was excited throughout England.

The religious casuistry and factions, to which this innovation gave birth, continued to ferment during several generations, and to produce direful spectacles of fanaticism and animosity. The infernal plot of the degraded Catholic sect, in James the First's reign, to blow up the king and parliament with gunpowder, is one amongst many other instances of this religious rage and mischievous frenzy. Puritanical piety, or rather fanaticism, which, in Cromwell's time, had been stretched to absurd and reprehensible extremes,

tremes, on the Restoration fell into discredit. Pretensions to sanctity could not afterwards pass so current; gravity could not so easily impose for wisdom, formality for virtue, and hypocrisy for religion. But the Calvinistic and other Protestant sectaries, however ridiculous and disgusting in their manners at that time, have the merit of kindling the first sparks of liberty against the assumed prerogative of the crown. A considerable part of the seventeenth century, from Charles the First to the Revolution, is stained with civil wars between prerogative and privilege, whose ravages were spread throughout Britain and Ireland.

The ancient arts and sciences, and particularly jurisprudence, were as early imported from Constantinople and Italy into England, as into France, and made equal advances. In the twelfth century a copy of the celebrated Roman jurisprudence, called Justinian's Pandects, was discovered by accident in Italy, and was soon spread

spread over Europe. It was cultivated with peculiar avidity in the English universities. But notwithstanding Justinian, Magna Charta, and the boasted rudiments of the English constitution, it is an incontrovertible fact, that no system of rational and general liberty prevailed in this island until the present century. That inestimable modern discovery, the art of printing, has contributed equally to enlighten the science of legislation, as well as all the other arts and sciences. But, liberty of the press, and even of speech in parliament, was unknown in the age of James the First; and the Star Chamber, and High Commission court, were little better than excrescences of the inquisition. By the Reformation in 1688, the king and people were first taught to know their proper boundaries. Until this event, prerogative and privilege had been at incessant variance. In the last and present century, the English House of Commons, aided by the general progress of literature and knowledge, gradually rescued the
kingdom

kingdom from aristocratical, and regal tyranny, and from the tyranny of a usurping faction. The authority and mutual encroachments of every part of our mixed government has been since more accurately defined, and circumscribed within due limits. Candour however must admit, that we are not yet exonerated from a mixture of vicious policy, under colour of constitutional principles.

The era of the external and remote additions to the British empire are posterior to the discovery of America, and of the passage to Asia by the Cape of Good Hope, both which are not far short of three hundred years. These discoveries ushered Britain and France into a variety of remote possessions in both these hemispheres. So early as James the First's reign, colonies from Britain began to be settled in the continent of America, and in the island of Barbadoes: and during the civil wars of Charles the First, New England and Maryland received British
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colonists

colonists from the wrangling sectaries of Protestants and Catholics. During the usurpation of Cromwell, Jamaica was wrested from Spain; and in the beginning of the present century Gibraltar. Although an English commercial company had traded to India from the beginning of the seventeenth century, yet the principal part of the vast dominions of Britain in Hindoostan was acquired during the present century, and even in the present generation.

In the course of the last few years, an erroneous system of policy, and the natural cravings of independence, have, with the assistance of France, severed the greatest part of her transatlantic empire from Britain. In consequence of this disaster, I leave it to others to decide, whether, in stating the balance of emigration, of the galling load of taxes, of the neglect of domestic improvement for foreign colonization and commerce, Great Britain is, upon the whole, a gainer or
 loser

loser by her rapaciousness of dominion in the Western hemisphere. I feel equal diffidence and aversion to hazard any predictions on the fate and duration of her Asiatic empire in Hindoostan. All I shall observe is, that legislators should extend their views to distant ages of futurity, and infinitely beyond the contracted span of the human generation. I do not recollect that Athens was long enriched by her distant colonies; and many reasons induce me to think, that they should be considered not as principal, but as subordinate pillars in the architecture of the British empire.

France, during the period now under review, kept pace with, or rather outstripped England in acquisitions of internal strength and solidity. By consent, force, or fraud, she added a number of large provinces, exclusive of those wrested from the English, to all sides of her vast empire. At the same time, by the humiliation of her mutinous and overgrown

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vassals,

vassals, her monarchy became infinitely more formidable and vigorous. Spain, by its sudden and immense aggrandizement in Europe and in America, between two and three centuries ago, although a more distant power, became the chief object of jealousy to the English. This colossus of dominion had so far intoxicated their haughty monarch, as to prompt him to an invasion of England; and, with the delusive hopes of its easy conquest, Spain became a sacrifice to her own ambition. These apprehensions of Spanish greatness had stifled and suspended, during one century, the ancient animosities between England and France, until the towering grandeur and ambition of Lewis the Fourteenth again revived those deep-rooted jealousies, and filled not only England, but Europe with alarm. In the beginning of his reign, France had attained to its highest pinnacle of exaltation since the era of Charlemagne. This imperious career

was,

was, however, checked at sea by the British navy; and on land by Marlborough, and Eugene.

C H A P. III.

A Chronological Sketch of the Navy, Militia, Army, Fortresses, and Marine Arsenals of Great Britain. Miscellaneous Reflections on each of the preceding Topics. Original Remarks on the Importance of Dover and Milford Haven.

AT the Roman invasion, the ships of the Britains were little superior to the canoes of the modern savages of America, and far inferior to those of the new discovered islands in the Pacific. After the departure of the Romans, necessity, self-defence, and the example of

the Baltic pirates, would prompt Britain to exert her strength on sea as well as on land.

Alfred, a wise and patriotic monarch, was vigilant to provide, against the Northern pirates, a respectable naval force, the natural defence of every island. He increased the shipping of the kingdom, both in number and size, and trained his people in the practice of navigation and naval evolutions. By these precautions the Danes were often intimidated, defeated, or intercepted in their predatory retreats. Athelstan, Alfred's grandson, enacted the following law, for the encouragement of navigation and commerce: "That any merchant, who
 " made three distant voyages to the Me-
 " diterranean or Baltic, should be reck-
 " oned as a gentleman." During Edgar's flourishing reign, he built and supported a powerful navy, for those days, which was divided into three squadrons, and directed to scour the coast of pirates.

It

It is recorded, that Earl Goodwin presented to King Hardicanute, the last of the Danish race, a ship richly gilt, and manned with eighty soldiers in handsome uniforms.

During many centuries after the Norman invasion, England seems to have been superior, both on sea and land, to the French. In John's reign, and thirteenth century, the English engaged the French fleet on the coast of Flanders, taking and destroying four hundred of their ships, and the remainder were burnt to prevent their capture. By this decisive blow they put an end to an intended invasion. In the same century, in the reigns of Henry the Third and of Edward the First, the French fleet were twice defeated in the channel by the English. It was in the first Edward's reign that the *Society of Merchant Adventurers* was instituted in England, for exporting woollen cloths to Antwerp, and for the increase of the marine. In the

fourteenth century, a decisive victory was gained by Edward the Third on the coast of Flanders, in which, according to some writers, thirty thousand French were killed or drowned, and two hundred and thirty ships captured. Many centuries, however, after the Norman invasion, most of the Kings of England hired ships, on emergencies, from the merchants, and with these they engaged the French. Some were also furnished by the Cinque Ports, as a kind of naval militia. Henry the Seventh expended 14000*l.* on one large ship, which, properly speaking, was the first national ship in the English navy. During Henry the Eighth's reign, the foreign commerce of England was confined principally to Flanders, where their woollen goods were dyed; and which then greatly excelled England in the mechanical arts, and in commerce, and navigation.

That patriotic Queen, Elizabeth, encouraged the merchants to build ships for
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commerce, and to depend less for freight in foreign bottoms. At the period of the formidable invasion, during her reign, the English were far inferior to the Spaniards, both in number and size of ships. All the sailors in England amounted then to about fourteen thousand, the royal navy to twenty-eight sail, and few of these exceeding the bulk of our largest frigates. The merchant ships were all of small size; the largest of which, in cases of emergency, were converted into ships of war. To repel the invasion of this boasted armada, the metropolis, the sea ports, the nobility and gentry, all fitted out ships at their own expence: London alone equipped thirty. Two thirds of the commerce of England, then centered in London, and was in the hands of a few merchants. The largest ship that ever came from the English docks was built in James the First's reign. She was 1400 tons, and carried 64 guns. In this reign the English had become celebrated in ship-building, and in the

foundery of iron cannon. During the usurpation of Cromwell, the English navy began to assume a formidable ascendent. Under the banners of the commonwealth, and also, in Charles the Second's reign, a multitude of desperate battles were fought in the narrow seas, between the English, Dutch, and French. At the Revolution, and towards the end of the last century, the British navy amounted to 133 ships, of all sizes, and required forty thousand men to man them. During the present century, the British navy has been augmented, both in number and in size, to a tremendous catalogue; to between four and five hundred sail, which, in extraordinary danger, they are able to man with one hundred thousand seamen and marines. This navy, throughout the last ninety years, has, in most instances, carried the flag of Britain triumphant over France; and sometimes over France and Spain united. It is by the Navy alone, like the golden chain of Jove, that the
remote

remote satellites of the British empire can be held suspended to its centre.

The Militia and Army are the next objects of comparative gradation to the navy. In the rude and uncultivated state of society and nations, every man, on the alarm of danger, is a soldier; and the first honours are decreed to him who excels in military courage or conduct. On the arrival of the Romans, the Britains had not emerged from this first stage of social barbarism. But in a state of civilization and refinement, arts, sciences, and occupations are immensely multiplied, and the duty of war is delegated into the hands of a few. In ancient Egypt, and in Hindoostan, at this day, the military class is distinct and hereditary.

The good and wise Alfred, after repelling the Danes, took care that all the nation, capable of bearing arms, should be registered and formed into militia,
who

who had a regular rotine of duty, and who were an excellent security on land, against the descent of the Northern pirates.—During the feudal system, land armies were suddenly raised and maintained by the military vassals; and often as suddenly disbanded. In Henry the Second's reign all able householders, and others, of sufficient property, were obliged to put themselves in military array, and to be provided with a suit of armour, and military weapons, for the defence of the kingdom. Henry the Fifth, before he embarked on the invasion of France, empowered commissioners to take a review of all the freemen in each county capable of service, to divide them into companies, and to keep them in readiness for resisting an invasion. In Henry the Eighth's reign, the free inhabitants throughout the kingdom were obliged to provide themselves with bows and arrows, pikes and halberts, armour and harness, and were frequently mustered. In the same reign some laws were also enacted,
and

and revived for the encouragement of *archery*. That execrable female bigot and tyrant, Mary, determined to disable the nation from resistance, by ordering general musters, and directing her commissioners to seize the arms, and to deposit them in forts and castles. But in Elizabeth's reign there were frequent reviews of the militia. The city of London alone mustered fifteen thousand militia and artillery, which were much patronized and respected by Henry the Eighth, and by his daughter Elizabeth. In James the First's reign, the militia of this island amounted to one hundred and sixty thousand. The trained bands of London were then as respectable as they are now contemptible and useless. On the Restoration in Charles the Second's reign, a formidable and disciplined militia were kept up in Britain and Ireland. Scotland and Ireland had each twenty thousand men. During the present century, neither Scotland nor Ireland have had any regular militia: but within the present generation,

generation, the militia of England have been new modelled and improved. The principal defect now is, that instead of forty thousand, the whole island should be provided with one hundred thousand.

It is generally alledged, that no vestiges of a standing Army existed in England before the era of Henry the Seventh; but the foreign conquerors are an exception to this statement. The Romans kept a standing army in Britain many centuries. In several instances also, the Saxons and Danes were hired for the purposes of plunder or butchery; and before the Norman invasion, some Danish troops were maintained, as a species of standing army. After the Norman invasion, Henry the Second introduced a practice of making a commutation of the baron's feudal service for money, and enlisted, during a stated contract, some of those disciplined adventurers, and predatory vagabonds, with which Europe then swarmed. Afterwards, in Edward the First's reign,

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it was customary with him, and some other sovereigns of Europe, frequently to commute the personal feudal service for money. Henry the Seventh is the first who maintained one hundred yeomen as the royal guard of his person and palace, who were all expert *archers*; but in whom, at present, it would be difficult to discover any other qualification, except size. Charles the First maintained a small standing army in Ireland; and during the hurricane of civil war between him and the parliament, troops were enlisted on both sides. Under Cromwell's commonwealth, a large standing army, amounting to upwards of fifty thousand men, were kept up in Britain and Ireland. On the Restoration, Charles the Second was permitted to retain only a small standing army of five thousand men in Britain, and ten thousand in Ireland; and this is usually called the epoch of the first regular standing army during peace, under the British monarchy. When the Prince of Orange, afterwards William the Third,

Third, landed in England, James the Second had thirty thousand regular troops on foot to oppose him, and the projected reformation in government. After this Revolution it is notorious, that William was ambitious to excess of military fame, and of being at the head of armies on the Continent. From that period, and throughout the present century, Britain has been involved in a labyrinth of Continental quarrels. The scene has been merely shifted from France to Flanders, and Germany, where three long and expensive wars have succeeded each other, by which, and the late American war, the nation was nearly brought to the brink of bankruptcy. The consequences must be dreadful and fatal, if our state pilots and charioteers do not yet see the impolicy and folly of either rivalling or imitating the Continental powers in standing armies of land forces.

The continent of Europe is now crowded with innumerable strong and expensive fortifications. Mankind, like
beasts,

beasts, birds, and fish of prey, are constantly on the watch, and guarding against the rapacity of each other. Happily for Britain, and for all other islands of sufficient magnitude and population, they do not stand in need of such an extravagant circumvallation of artificial ramparts and ditches. There are very few places in Britain wherein it is necessary to erect expensive monuments on the modern systems of Vauban and Cohorn.

We have already observed, that on the arrival of the Romans, the Britains were collected into forests, and their congregation of huts secured with ramparts and ditches; and that St. Albans and Malden were two of their principal cities. During the residence of the Romans, the natives could not fail to learn some of their system of tactics and of fortification, the ruins of which remained many centuries after. The tower of London, built by William Rufus, and Dover Castle, were long considered as the most important

important fortresses in England. In Henry the Second's reign, the royal and barons castles had multiplied to upwards of eleven hundred : many of these Gothic fortifications were filled with troops of licensed robbers, and a banditti of idle vassals. Within the last three centuries, Portsmouth and Plymouth have, in successive reigns, received important additions to their docks and fortifications. Cromwell erected a chain of forts in Scotland to curb the inhabitants, which were afterwards demolished ; and some towards the Northern extremity have since been added. Indeed many of the fortresses in Scotland and Ireland are not calculated to resist a foreign invasion ; and at present it would be folly and insanity to cover a whole kingdom with fortifications, which can be protected with more effect, and less expence, by ships. On the fortifications and harbours, between Dover and Harwich, I shall have an opportunity shortly to animadvert.

On

On each of the preceding topicks, the British navy, militia, army, fortresses, and marine arsenals, I shall submit a few reflections. Every one knows, that within the last four centuries, immense Revolutions have taken place in military operations and weapons on sea and land, in naval architecture, and in fortifications; all of which may be traced to the modern invention of gunpowder. It is said, that the first remarkable action in Europe, in which cannon were used, was in the fourteenth century, at the battle of Crecy, by Edward the Third. But cannon and firelocks were then, and long after, extremely cumbersome, ill constructed and managed. At sea and in sieges every thing now depends on artillery: yet it will admit of doubt, whether the long pike, the victorious weapon of the Macedonian phalanx, should have been totally abandoned on the introduction of the firelock and bayonet. In every thing relating to the sea, there can be no comparison between the ancients and moderns;

derns ; but on land, very little improvement seems to have been made to the construction and evolutions of the Roman legion.

On the navy I propose to offer a few hints, calculated to two objects, the increase of the nursery of sailors, and of the actual marine force of the nation. As to the first, I believe that the most certain and durable recruit of sailors must be sought for from our domestic and foreign fisheries, and from the coasting trade ; and that it would be politic and practicable for the legislature to give more encouragement to the consumption of fish and oil. Britain has another powerful, but, hitherto, neglected resource of naval strength in peace and war. From the parochial charity schools of England, and from the necessitous poor of the metropolis, ten thousand sturdy boys, turned of ten years of age, might be annually selected, and sent, at the expence of their parishes, or other public institutions, on board

board of ships, to be stationed, for that purpose, in the different sea-ports. By one year's training, they would furnish a constant recruit both to the royal and mercantile service ; and would, in a considerable degree, alleviate the rigours of the impress duty. These are truly the children and property of the state ; and in no other mode can so effectually recompense their benefactors.

Besides converting half of the British standing army of infantry and cavalry into marines and naval artillery, I submit to more experienced judges, whether it would not be more beneficial to the public, and render the naval service more uniform and harmonious, if the officers of marines were all to be drafted from the corps of midshipmen. At present, during peace, this young class of soldiers are turned adrift on the world without pay ; too many of them must then become burthensome to their families, or must seek for bread in foreign countries, or

starve in goals. Or suppose them, at length, promoted to Lieutenants in the navy, how few, without interest, can rise above that rank? By this intimate incorporation of the naval and marine service, there would, in extreme danger, be a double strength of officers, sufficiently expert in both naval and land evolutions. It can never be too often inculcated, *that the standing army of Britain and Ireland should be principally, if not wholly, amphibious.* In many arts and sciences almost one third of life is obliged to be spent in acquiring the rudiments: and will any one have the effrontery to assert, that interest or money should be the sole recommendation to promotion in the land or marine service? How many expeditions have failed, from the reciprocal ignorance and bickerings of the commanders of the sea and land forces, and from their superficial knowledge of the duty of each other?

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With respect to the militia and army, there is ample scope for reprehension. Mr. Hume, the British historian, makes the following remark :—" It is observable, that though the military profession requires great genius, and long experience, in *the principal commanders*, all its subordinate duties may be discharged by ordinary talents ; and from superficial practice, citizens and country gentlemen soon become excellent officers. The generals of greatest fame and capacity happened all of them to spring up on the side of the parliament, during the civil wars of Charles the First. The courtiers and great nobility, in the royal party, checked the growth of any extraordinary genius amongst the subordinate officers ; and every man there, as in a regular established government, was confined to the station in which his birth had placed him."

All the essentials of military institutions for real action, and the great moment of engagement, are very few. Two thirds of the parade evolutions are then superfluous. Six or eight manœuvres, says G——l L——d, are sufficient for all cases. To preserve order and regularity in the ranks and line, whether it moves slow, quick, or oblique, and especially when advancing with rapidity; to front forwards, and to both sides; to form the line expeditiously from the columns, and, *vice versa*; to load and fire with expedition and effect; to be obedient, silent, brave, and to have regularity and velocity in every action and motion; these are the fundamental qualifications of the militia, and of every other soldier, when brought face to face with the enemy.

I shall not assert, that the peace establishment of the infantry of Britain is too numerous, considering the distant settlements and garrisons which they are
also

also obliged to guard. But this I maintain, and I could quote not only the written authority of G——l L——d, but also of the late celebrated Marshal Keith, to the same effect, that it would be infinitely more advantageous for the nation, if at least one half of the standing army of the empire was converted into marines. It is to be hoped, that the British nation will never hereafter suffer themselves to be misled into Continental quarrels, except they can act on their proper element, the sea. But should this system of folly, weakness, and corruption, continue to be persevered in, let them, of two evils, chuse the least; they can hire land armies of disciplined soldiers, at one third the expence of their own, from several German potentates, and from the Swiss. As to cavalry, half of the thirty regiments might be disbanded, without any public loss or regret. The men, horses, and accoutrements are an enormous expence. They never can be wanted to guard our distant possessions, nor

to attack those of the enemy. Before any invasion could take place, sufficient time would intervene for raising and training a competent force of cavalry. In preventing smuggling, the navy and marines will be more effectual; and for quelling accidental riots, a better police, with the standing forces and militia, will insure the execution of all wholesome laws.

I cannot subscribe to an assertion of Mr. Hume's, " that, so late as James " the First's reign, two thousand Cavalry " could not be properly mounted through- " out England, such was the scarcity of " good horses." We know, that much earlier in Henry the Fifth's wars, that he had a considerable body of cavalry in his army when he invaded France; and Queen Elizabeth had two thousand cavalry mixed with her infantry, to oppose the Spanish invasion. It is equally notorious, that a horse was part of the paraphrenalia of the reigning passion, chivalry,

valry, and knighthood. The Swifs and Spaniards, some centuries ago, excelled in difciplined infantry; and fince that, the proportion of cavalry, more efpecially of the unwieldy fquadrons, has been abridged. It is an obfervation of G——l L——d, “ that new raifed cavalry generally behave better in action, than new raifed infantry; the former being carried on at full gallop, without having time to reflect on their danger. In the modern hiftory of our own, and of other continental armies, we have many proofs of this propofition. We know that velocity will compenfate for weight; and that light cavalry can baffle heavy, even in line. But if ever an actual invafion fhould render it neceffary, there is now in this ifland an ample felection of weight and velocity united, fufficient to mount two hundred thoufand men. Sound policy however would dictate more encouragement to the employment and multiplication of oxen in agriculture, in preference to horfes.

Every patriotic king of Britain will, next to the navy and marines, patronize the militia. The legionary soldiers of Rome, during many centuries, consisted of militia; and at this day the Swiss and Prussian armies are a mixture of militia. By the transmutation of half the standing army into marines and naval artillery, a force of between twenty and thirty thousand men would be added to the navy, without a shilling extra expence, besides affording an overplus towards augmenting the militia. Fleets then could be fitted out at a short notice, instead of delaying to ransack the nation for raw recruits, and for the scourgings of goals. A standing army would then be an excellent nursery for the navy, and wars might be brought to a speedy issue, without harraffing commerce so oppressively, and without draining to the dregs the revenues and resources of the nation. The scandalous traffic in commissions would thereby be prodigiously checked, and the influence of the executive government

vernment would suffer no diminution. Wishing to be as concise as possible, I must here omit some observations which I had arranged together on the pay of the British standing army, since its first institution, somewhat more than one century ago ; and also on the present mode of enlistment for life.

I proceed now to a subject which G——l L——d has not thought proper to discuss in his Rhapsody, but on which, I have opportunity to know, he could have communicated much useful and original information. I allude to *Dover*, and the whole range of coast from thence to the Thames.

In all that extensive arch between Portsmouth and the mouths of the Medway, and the Thames, there is not a harbour, port, or asylum, capable of safely admitting and sheltering large ships, when endangered by storms or an enemy. One half of the British commerce must
incessantly

incessantly pass and repass this tract of coast and channel, exposed in war to the cruizers and privateers of France, especially between Dunkirk and Cherbourg. Nature has made the straits of Dover the principal maritime pass and defile of Britain, through which the respective commerce of the Northern and Southern nations of Europe is conveyed, and through which France must transport her naval stores from the Baltic. Art, therefore, should be employed in the assistance of nature, so as to construct a harbour, capable of receiving ships of war and commerce when in danger or distress. They cannot, without great risk, lay in the Downs during the equinoctial gales, and winter season, and therefore without a convenient, and safe port in the vicinity, there is neither security against storms, nor against a superior enemy, nor a convenient station for interrupting their commerce and convoys. Dover is an intermediate stage between Portsmouth and the Nore; it seems a most

most important barrier to the Medway and to the Thames; and a hostile debarkation on the part of France, north of Dover, might in a variety of ways be annoyed from that intermediate post. These narrow straits, a dangerous coast, and a secure harbour would even compensate for a considerable inferiority of maritime force, both in naval action, and as laying so advantageously for the interception of naval stores. Multitudes of ships and materials of commerce would then be preserved, which are annually wrecked in that tract of channel, exclusive of the insurances and captures in war. What dreadful havock has France made in the narrow seas amongst our merchantmen? Nor can we retaliate, with equal facility, as the rich commercial ports of France lay at a greater distance from our coast and reach. Within the last hundred years, Dunkirk, and lately Cherbourg, have been constructed, at an enormous expence, by France, notoriously, as a Scylla and Charybdis,

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to devour the British commerce. We should be unjust to ourselves, were we to neglect the means of counteracting these ambuscades, and overt stratagems of France.

But if the arguments I have here used, in favour of Dover, should fail to impress conviction, I have many more in reserve, and weighty authority to support me. It is a secret lodged in the French cabinet, and known but to very few persons in England, that some years after the late rebellion in Scotland, G——l L——d was employed by the French ministry, together with five other engineers and pilots, to survey the harbour of Dunkirk, and to determine whether it could not, by art, be made a complete marine arsenal and deep harbour. At that time the French King and ministry had it in contemplation to attempt the next invasion of England, in concert with the exiled family of Stuart, from Dunkirk, and to strike, if possible, directly at the
British

British metropolis ; or, at all events, to be enabled, from thence, to commit greater depredations on the British commerce, in its flux and reflux by the Thames. I have perused a copy of these engineer's report and memorial to the French cabinet, which is now in the possession of G——l L——d's friend. The plan, the number of convicts, soldiers, and sailors, necessary to complete the works, the expence and time, are all stated.

Dunkirk, together with part of French Flanders, when taken from the Spanish monarchy by the joint arms of the English and French in 1658, was surrendered into the hands of Cromwell. Some years after it was sold to the French by Charles the Second, as a temporary supply for his profligate expences. In the possession of that rival it was calculated, during war, to be an extreme annoyance to the English commerce. But it was Lewis the Fourteenth who made it a good sea-port, and
fortifi-

fortification. Afterwards, at the end of two ruinous wars to France, in the reigns of Lewis the Fourteenth and Fifteenth, it was stipulated, as an indispensable article of peace, that the fortifications and harbour of Dunkirk should be demolished and filled up, within four months, at the expence of France, and never to be repaired. When G——l L——d had surveyed the channel coast of England a second time as a spy of France, he could not suppress sarcastic remarks upon the stupidity, or —— of the British ministers and engineers, who never had endeavoured to render all these projects of France, from the side of Dunkirk, abortive, by means of Dover. This he termed, emphatically, the counter plan of England. The old town of Dover lays in a valley, on the foundation of which G——l L——d, and his military friend at that time, recommended a harbour to be scooped out, and a new town to be erected on the ascent, or declivity, on each side of this harbour.

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There would be sufficient depth of water, and a current of back water ; and the fortifications might be rendered as impregnable as those of Gibraltar. It was also recommended to make it a free port, so as to rival and surpass Dunkirk in commerce and population. I conceive that our convicts would be more profitably employed in such labour, and in clearing harbours, than in distant and extravagant voyages to Botany Bay.

Every unprejudiced judge will, I believe, admit, that in the present century immense sums, upwards of half a million sterling, have been squandered, to very little purpose, on the harbour of Ramsgate, and the fortifications of Chatham. In the opinion of skilful engineers, the last is a flagrant imposition and public robbery. Sheerness and Upnor castles, the barriers of the Medway, were forced by the Dutch in Charles the Second's reign ; but they were repulsed on the Thames at Tilbury Fort. If, however,

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France

France should revive her project of invasion against the head and heart of our island, these different forts, as far as Harwich, would, probably, require some additional strength.

Turning our attention next to the Western coast of England, we perceive *Milford Haven*, a convenient, capacious, and safe harbour, situated on the projecting coast of Wales, in a central situation between Britain and Ireland, and between Bristol and Liverpool. From its situation and port, it seems admirably calculated to protect and promote the whole commerce of the west coast of Britain, of the opposite coast of Ireland, and of the intermediate channel. It has many recommendations to render it a principal rendezvous of domestic and northern fisheries, and a nursery of sailors. It is out of the reach, or at least easy access of any Southern, and still more, of any Northern foe. Nature too has been bountiful in constructing it, with very little

little addition of art, an asylum and retreat with difficulty affailable. There is no harbour on the whole west coast of Britain to be compared to Milford Haven, and none is so shamefully neglected. It is well entitled to become the metropolis of Wales, and a naval nursery.

C H A P. IV.

Of the present relative, and absolute Force of Great Britain and France, respecting Invasion and Defence. Of the Parts of Britain most exposed to Invasion; and the most judicious Disposition of the defending Troops. Conjectures, whether the other Powers of Europe would suffer France, were she in reality able, to conquer Great Britain.

IT is only within these few centuries that the modern nations of Europe have taken their political rank and station, and have emerged from rusticity and barbarism. But the comparative scale and barometer are varying every generation. Nations and empires, like the human race, are a moving picture, and in perpetual fluctuation. The modern free cities on the Baltic and German Ocean, Venice, Portugal and Spain all preceded Britain
and

and France in maritime renown. Somewhat more than one hundred years ago, in the minority of Lewis the 14th, the naval force of France was far inferior to that of England. But during a few years only of that reign, a patriotic minister raised France to be one of the first maritime powers of Europe, at least in force, though perhaps not in resources; and on land it was superior in numbers to every other. The English and Dutch in their different alliances at that period with the French, had taught them naval evolutions and tactics; and the profligacy of that agreeable, but inglorious monarch Charles the Second, gave them many advantages of maritime aggrandizement.

Since the beginning of the present century, not only the external, but also the internal strength of Britain had, until lately, prodigiously and progressively increased. The jarring interests, prejudices, and jealousies of both islands, together with their civil and religious dis-

sensions have gradually subsided ; an event in which all had equal reason to rejoice. For it is not improbable, had not England, Scotland, and Ireland been united under one crown, and incorporated into one compact government, one people, and one interest ; that, sooner or later, they might have shared the fate of the ancient Greek republics. Some enterprising monarch of the Continent, like the crafty Macedonian, would not have failed to take advantage of their civil dissensions and weakness, and in the end, would have crushed them into tributary provinces. Such fortunate union of government and interest, authorizes me, in contradiction to the arrogant insinuation of Mr. Dupont, “ that Britain and “ Ireland retain their liberty, property, “ and political rank, at the discretion “ and forbearance of France,” to say, that the British empire is not inferior to France in absolute, and is superior in relative strength. At the same time we admit, that by the dismemberment of North America,

America, and the consequent load of national debt, Great Britain has been hurled from a summit of power, magnificence, and strength.

If France, merely from the impolicy, negligence, and ignorance of our Legislators, has more than double the population of Great Britain and Ireland, the latter have more than treble the extent of sea coast and harbours, a circumstance so transcendently essential to maritime superiority. Great Britain and Ireland, in point of situation, have some prominent advantages, as durable as the globe, and of which no human power nor malevolence can deprive them : a general convulsion of the elements is alone adequate to subvert nature. An island in war has the advantage over a continent. The first has but a small extent, and a few specific points to defend, and is accessible but by one draw-bridge, a navy, whereas France has several avenues by which an enemy could enter. As to this menaced

invasion, which this mettlesome French writer flatters himself is to put an end to our existence. it would puzzle him to satisfy his sober readers, how that is to take place, before the British fleet is defeated. How are those French grenadiers to be exported hither ; by wings, balloons, or cork jackets ? Is France superior in ships, or in sailors ? The writer should know, that it is an axiom of Great Britain never to desert the dominion of the channel, nor to drop the trident, until she has encountered a series of naval shocks and disasters, and is driven from the last plank. The history of Athens under Themistocles, furnishes her with a conspicuous precedent of the inefficacy of the most formidable invasion on record, when disabled by defeat at sea. Nor is the British history barren of such decisive precedents.

Great Britain and Ireland not only outstrip France on the true element of dominion, in maritime strength and numbers,

bers, but they can even bring as many fighting men into the field as France can spare to invade them. France cannot possibly raise during war above 300,000 land forces; at least she cannot maintain more without crippling her marine. One third of these, however, are indispensable, merely for stationary guards of her frontiers, and foreign possessions. Her offensive land army, therefore, cannot, at the extremity, exceed 100,000. Let us see what our two islands have to oppose to this invading force.

If the Northern part of our island was to raise a militia in proportion to that maintained by the South part, which is both reasonable and equitable; then the united militia of Great Britain might, with very little additional difficulty or expence, be augmented to 100,000 effective and athletic men. It was by a feudal militia that England gained all her victories and conquests in France. The metropolis would be far more effectually
secured

secured against foreign or domestic depredation, by substituting ten thousand periodical militia, in lieu of the present banditti of trained bands and night watch. Great Britain can also, in a short time, make a sufficient augmentation to her regular forces in both islands, to her artillery, infantry, and cavalry. Ireland with ease could, and should be encouraged, in peace as well as in war, to raise a militia, in the proportion of one third to that of Great Britain. Her patriotic army of disciplined volunteers would then be superfluous, except in very extraordinary emergencies. The two islands are so happily situated, that they could not be prevented, by any foreign foe, from mutually co-operating with, and assisting each other, according to the exigency, and the movements of the invader. By Wales, and by Scotland, there are a variety of practicable, and easy channels of communication.

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Nor is this one half of the effective force with which Great Britain and Ireland could burst indignant upon their invaders. A large auxiliary reserve of militia might be disciplined throughout all the parishes of Great Britain and Ireland, to supply the emergencies of the field. It is also well known that no nation in Europe has the materials of an equestrian force, equally numerous and formidable with that of Great Britain. The natives are half trained to horsemanship; and all the essentials of the equestrian exercise can be acquired in three months, without much trouble or expence. Indeed it would rather be an agreeable and manly amusement, and a meritorious revival of the ancient tournaments. Volunteer associations of this description could not fail to call forth a tremendous strength against invaders. Cornwall, near which, probably, the invaders would land, boasts of a hardy and rugged race of 80,000 tin miners. Are our enemies aware what strenuous efforts could be made by rich
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companies,

companies, corporations, cities, and individuals, to assist their country both by sea and land ; that these alone are capable of equipping a powerful navy and militia? A free and brave nation, like an individual roused into indignation, is capable of the most desperate acts, especially when contending “ pro aris & focus,” and would either prove victorious, or bury themselves in the ruins.

As it would be incumbent on Britain, in such a crisis of empire, to exert every sinew, and nerve of strength, it may not be improper to point out another easy method of rendering her much more formidable on land. For a defensive war of posts, he who can expeditiously load, fire, and hit his mark, is an excellent soldier. The rifle gun and blunderbuss, the cross and steel bow, and the long pike, seem extremely well calculated for such irregular combat, and are suited both to infantry and cavalry. At the battle of Naseby,

Naseby, between King Charles and the parliament army under Essex, the latter presented an invincible rampart of pikes against the furious shock of Prince Rupert's cavalry. The Arabian horsemen have all long pikes. The present cavalry of Egypt, called Mamalukes, have each slung round them a blunderbuss, or short gun, which discharges twelve bullets, two short pistols in their waist belt, and a crooked sword; and are constantly exercised in firing at marks, and in the practice of the sabre.

G——l Lloyd, in his military history of Germany, calculates that, on an average, one only of four hundred shots takes effect in land battles; and perhaps the odds is greater in sea fights. Marshal Saxe also, in his memoirs, censures the impotent noise of ordnance and musquetry, and especially of platoon firing. It is a fact, that during all the last German war, there were not two thousand British troops in the list of killed. History

tory instructs us that in former ages the *English Archers*, by the wise policy of our forefathers, were trained with peculiar diligence to become expert marksmen, and were of infinite service in the wars and victories in France. Even the stern discipline of the ancient Roman legion, was often compelled to yield to the superior dexterity and agility of the Parthian archers. The immortal Homer, whom all military men should learn by heart, and whose *Iliad* the Macedonian hero always laid under his pillow, points out the vast importance of dextrous marksmen. These military essentials are now shamefully neglected by us, and are sacrificed to empty parade.

But it is not alone the degeneracy of our modern military institutions, which renders us less formidable on land to an invader; our imperious system of game laws is calculated to suppress the use and exercise of fire arms amongst our yeomanry, to expose a brave people in the
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day of national danger, and to pave the way for the introduction and success of a more sagacious antagonist. Would those who are obliged to buy annual licences to shoot partridges, be the defenders of Britain against a foreign enemy? Is it prudent to sacrifice the dearest interest and security of the nation to such a paltry revenue, and to all the other wretched chicanery of the game statutes? Besides, there is no effectual method to wean the lower class of the nation from the brutal art of boxing, but by substituting some other manly exercise, more entertaining and useful, and which it would be prudent to encourage equally with horse racing, by lucrative and honorary rewards. I mean the cross and steel bow, and rifle gun.

Marshal Saxe, G——l L——d, and the best modern writers agree that 50,000 men are sufficient to decide the fate of any battle on land. Indeed there are few places in England where so many troops on each side could be brought into action ;

tion : ranged in line, with proper intervals, they would extend six miles. Besides, an army acting on the defensive, and in their own country, particularly if that country is full of defiles and passes, is equal to double or treble the number of assailants. The former having the choice of ground, could to its natural strength add artificial ; and in other parts they are defended by regular fortifications. If the French, as their volunteer herald, Mr. Dupont, seems to threaten, should come over with all the pomp and number of Xerxes, and with all the fanaticism of Crusaders, in all probability, they must speedily return, or perish by famine and disease. In truth, conquest is neither a necessary consequence of superior number, nor of revenue. If such was the inevitable result, Greece should have been but a morsel to Xerxes, and China should be able to swallow up Europe.

From

From the comparison of the sea and land forces of the invaders and defenders, and of their reciprocal difficulties and advantages, we come to say a few words only on another important subject of national strength, on Revenue. The relative and absolute power derived from revenue, will be very different in different countries, and in the same country in different centuries. Of all the modern nations in Europe, England was many centuries one of the least oppressed with taxes. The nation had indeed smarted under clerical rapine; but the parliaments, however submissive and pusillanimous in other respects to their monarchs, had always carried their frugality of the national purse even to a niggardly extreme. The supplies granted in one long reign, two or three centuries ago, would be swallowed up in a single campaign of the present century. It is by no means a subject of which we can boast that Britain and Ireland, with not half the population, now raise an annual revenue not inferior

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to France; including in the general estimate, as is done in France, the parochial, and other extraneous subsidies and contributions. The Revolution, however meritorious and indispensable for the security of civil and religious liberty, and for the expulsion of a bigot and tyrant, engrafted and entailed a new disease into our Constitution; the system of national debt, of borrowing, mortgaging, and devouring the revenues of posterity. The cup of good is seldom dealt to man unmixed. This consumption and canker has continued, throughout the present century, to prey upon the vitals of the nation. It proceeds gradually in sapping the foundation of liberty and property. Taxation is now to Britain one of the severest calamities and scourges of war. Who can, with truth, deny that it is not in several instances stretched to oppression? “Sunt
 “certi denique fines, quos ultro citraque
 “nequit consistere rectum,” is justly applicable to the modern financeering schemes of Britain, Holland, and France.

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They have long been running races of prodigality and extortion, and have depended as much upon the weight of gold and credit, as upon iron and lead in ruining one another. By such profusion, two of those powers have become nearly exhausted. One of them lingers in an incurable decline. The other has lately made a daring effort to disburthen herself and posterity of this load. Let us also hope that Britain will be able to extricate herself in sufficient time, so as to meet her rival on terms of equality. Promises and protestations of disinterestedness, would be but a slender security against future molestation from that quarter.

It is of importance to be able to predict, and with tolerable certainty, by what nation, and in what part of our coast we are most exposed to invasion; and at the same time to determine the most judicious disposition of the defending troops. If we look round the different nations of Europe, or of the globe, for

a probable invader of Britain or Ireland, we shall find very few capable, or whose interest it would be to make that experiment. The Mediterranean powers (France excepted) are too remote or weak. From the nations on the Baltic, which is frozen up half the year, there seems little danger, and the eastern coast of Britain would there be principally exposed. On the eastern flank, Ireland is screened by Britain, and its invaders from that quarter must either sail round the North of Scotland, or run the gauntlet along the Eastern and Southern coast of Britain. But if Russia should reach the goal of her ambition and politics, the expulsion of the Turk from Europe, an event not improbable, nor seemingly distant, all the enlightend and leading powers of our hemisphere must then shrink, both by land and by sea, into inferior satellites.

During several centuries, England continued to invade France, principally by the narrow passes of the channel; from
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whence we might, "a priori," suppose, that France would pursue a similar system of proximity. But the immense improvements and revolutions, during the three last centuries, in naval architecture and tactics, in fortification and engineering, require harbours more deep and convenient to insure the invaders footing and progress. It is obvious, from the relative geography alone of Great Britain and France, that the maritime and channel counties of Cornwall, Devonshire, Somersetshire, Dorsetshire, Hampshire, Sussex, Kent, Essex, and Suffolk, comprehended in an arch from Plymouth to Harwich, must be the principal theatres of invasion by any southern foe such as France and Spain. The Essex and Suffolk coast are however in least danger from that quarter; and further north on the German Ocean, it is not probable that these southern foes will ever venture, at least for the purpose of effective invasion, but only as a diversion from the grand object. Throughout this extent of coast

the defender has but a few fixed points, or posts of peculiar consequence on land to contend with the enemy; these are Plymouth, Portsmouth, some parts of the Isle of Wight, and the passage of the Needles, the Forts and Docks on the Medway, and the Thames, the Metropolis, and Landguard Fort. The enemy should not be encouraged, by the weakness of any of these, to take them by a "coup de main." Plymouth and Portsmouth would require a regular siege. At the same time suspicions might be entertained, that the two great commercial cities on the Western coast of England, Bristol, and Liverpool, would be included in the collateral objects of invasion or depredation, on the part of France.

If ever a northern maritime nation should invade Great Britain, of which there is no instance during the last seven centuries, such invasion would probably be to the North of Dover, and perhaps in a line between Harwich and the Downs.

Downs. Indeed it is not improbable, notwithstanding the perils of the navigation and coast, that they might attempt to molest Hull, and also to cut off the principal magazine of fuel from London, and an important nursery of the British marine. Part of these inconveniences might be prevented by an additional stock of fuel in reserve. Besides, an enemy would find it no easy task to subdue upwards of 100,000 sturdy colliers, who might be assembled in the neighbourhood of Newcastle, Shields, and Whitehaven. From attacks on Edinburgh and Glasgow, the invader would, probably, reap as few laurels. And most of the principal manufacturing cities and towns of Great Britain are without the reach of surprise or pillage, by being placed at some distance from the sea coast, with which, however, they have an easy communication by rivers or canals.

As no foreign invasion for the subjugation of England had been attempted, during

ing five centuries, until the reign of Elizabeth, it may be both curious and useful to examine the modern disposition of the defending troops, and the preparations of defence against such malevolent projects. Elizabeth's principal camp was at Tilbury Fort, obviously to cover the Thames and the metropolis: Plymouth and Portsmouth were not at that time marine arsenals of such immense importance as they are at present. The Spanish plan was, that the Armada should sail close along the French shore, as far as Dunkirk, and having chased away all the English cruisers, should there join the Duke of Parma. 34000 troops were assembled in Flanders, and kept in readiness to be embarked in flat bottomed boats. These added to 20,000 from Spain, made the land army alone of invaders 50,000; with which united, they had orders to sail up the Thames, and thus to attempt at one blow the conquest of England.

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The principal fleet of England was stationed at Plymouth, and a small fleet off Dunkirk to awe, and intercept the auxiliary debarkation of troops from Flanders. The land forces of England were disposed as follows: 20,000 militia were distributed along the channel coast where any landing was practicable, and directions given them, if they could not hinder the Spaniards from gaining the shore, to retire backwards, to waste the country around, and to wait for reinforcements from the neighbouring counties, before they opposed the enemy: 22,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry were stationed at Tilbury Fort; and 34,000 foot, and 1000 horse were appointed for defending the Queen's person, and were as a reserve to march wherever the enemy should appear in force. In sailing up the channel, this invincible Armada of Spain was infested with incessant skirmishes of the light English fleet which hovered in their rear, and which, though much inferior in size and number, after several
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engagements compelled them finally to fly round by the North of Scotland, half of them being captured or destroyed.

In the subsequent projected invasion of the Duke of Norfolk, in order to liberate Mary Queen of Scots, then confined in England, it was intended by Spain, to land from the side of Flanders, 10,000 men at Harwich, and to march to the metropolis. William, Prince of Orange, landed his army at Torbay. Within the present century, France several times meditated and attempted, from Dunkirk and from Brest, an invasion of Britain and Ireland; especially when she had hopes of profiting by the civil dissensions of the nation, and of imposing an exiled tyrant. Three attempts of this sort were frustrated in the successive reigns of William, Anne, and George the First. Her reiterated projects, in 44 and 54, wherein G——l L——d bore a part have been already noticed. In the late war it appears that the object of the combined
fleets

fleets of France and Spain in 1779, was Plymouth; and a publication by one of the spies or incendiaries of France, exposes still more glaringly their insidious schemes against that naval arsenal. Had they succeeded against this Fortress, and the British fleet, it is not improbable that their land army, then in readiness on the channel coast, might have afterwards attempted Chatham and the metropolis.

During the two last wars, Coxheath, near Maidstone in Kent, and Worley, contiguous to Brentwood in Essex, were the principal camps for the defence of England. Their situation is more healthy than that of Tilbury Fort, from which they are distant but a few hours march. A few regiments of cavalry were also assembled on Salisbury Plain: but Plymouth and Portsmouth had neither fortification nor garrison adequate to their defence, and were excluded almost without the pale of succour. G——l L——d's distribution of the defending troops has
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been laid before the reader ; and there is no necessity to repeat it.

I have now endeavoured to demonstrate that France is unable to subdue Great Britain and Ireland. But were she really adequate to these military wonders and miracles, would the other powers of Europe tamely look on, and behold the downfall of such an important member ? Would they sit, like the audience in a theatre, or like the gods and goddesses on Mount Ida, as inactive spectators of these gallic triumphs, and British degradation ? On this subject we must be cautious of drawing conclusions from remote precedents, such as Rome, Carthage, &c. because the circumstances and parallel, are extremely different in many points of comparison. Europe is now subdivided into many powerful states, who will not suffer the political equilibrium to be so immensely deranged ; and whose private interest and policy would unite them in opposition to any invader. The modern history

tory of Europe furnishes instances in abundance of the truth of this proposition.

The writer, who represents Britain as such an easy prey to France, in his impetuosity, forgot to reflect, that whilst France may be occupied in the invasion of Britain, one or more auxiliary armies in the latter's favour may force an entrance into France; and it is not impossible might traverse from Dunkirk to Brest before the invader had set foot in the bank of England. Would Britain's Continental allies be idle spectators? Even Austria might think it a convenient opportunity to recover some of those rich provinces, of which, in her misfortunes, she was plundered by France. Britain has often rescued Austria and Holland from her arbitrary gripe. Would the Northern nations of Europe be such conspirators against their dearest interests, as to acquiesce in France taking possession of all the narrow avenues and strong holds through which their commerce must

must be waisted, not only to the South of Europe, but to every part of the globe? Would these nations submit to such an enormous grasp of power in the hands of France, whose general character, at least in her politicks with other nations, is neither conspicuous for moderation, nor plain dealing? In the present state of France, these vaunts and menaces of universal dictatorship are premature and impolitic.

G——l L——d, in his Military History, calculates that if the Northern frontier alone of France, from Switzerland to Dunkirk, was to be vigorously attacked in three different points, it would require two hundred thousand men, distributed into separate armies, for defence; exclusive of strong garrisons in all the intermediate fortresses. And the other three sides of the French frontiers, especially the ports, and naval arsenals, could not be left defenceless.

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It appears, on many accounts, problematical, whether an invasion of Great Britain by France would not be more injurious to the invader than to the defender. Persia was disgraced, and nearly ruined by the invasion of Greece. Spain sunk much of her treasure and renown in the boasted Armada. France was no gainer by her repeated invasions of Germany, Italy, and Holland. Lewis the Fourteenth, with half a million of soldiers, and without the necessity of crossing any sea, was driven back from Holland, which could not then muster one third of the present effective strength of Britain and Ireland. What naval or land trophies did Lewis the Fourteenth and Fifteenth gain to their country, by their repeated stratagems and attempts to invade Britain and Ireland? It might, probably, be a fortunate circumstance for the British empire, were France to put these public threats into execution. By thus grappling with our domestic lion, she might
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be disabled from doing us any injury during a long period, and we might pursue in peace our commerce and industry. There could not, without gross ignorance, or treachery, be any just grounds to deprecate the attempt as a national calamity. In such a conflict, Great Britain, in her offensive operations and retaliation, should abandon her former system of military empiricism. *She never can revenge herself against France but upon the ocean, and by dismemberment of her transatlantic colonies.*

CONCLUSION.

CONCLUSION.

Miscellaneous.

AT the Norman invasion there were but few cities in England, and these few neither populous nor opulent. From the union of the Saxon Heptarchy, until after the first Norman, Winchester had been the principal residence, and also the mausoleum of royalty.

However strange it may appear, the defence of Great Britain is connected not only with the *population*, but with its geographical position, and even with parliamentary representation. In what do all the French writers principally exult in the superiority of France over Britain and Ireland? In comparative population and numbers. If we search for the foundation and columns of substantial power and revenue, we shall find them

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to consist in *agriculture, mineralogy, manufactures, commerce, fisheries, population.*

These may be termed the six elements, or orders of political architecture; they reciprocally assist and sustain each other, and are at the same time intimately connected with all the arts and sciences, and with political freedom. On each of these comprehensive sciences, a separate professor and lecturer should be established throughout our universities. But upon the latter of these alone, population, as being deeply involved in the subject of the present treatise, I shall make a few observations. Did time permit, I should have no difficulty in demonstrating, that Britain and Ireland might, in one century only, be rendered equal in population to France, and that in a single generation her maritime strength might be trebled. In this and many other instances of political œconomy, we might learn important lessons from the Chinese and Japanese. What made the Russians finally triumph over the Swedes? Numbers. The glare of
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an immense but oppressive revenue, and of a mighty catalogue of ships of war, must, in time, suffer an eclipse, should the subject of population continue to be treated with the same cold indifference by our legislators and ministers.

If we draw a line across the Southern base of Great Britain, from London to Bath and Bristol, and another line from London to Harwich, we shall comprehend in these two segments of the coast all the parts of Great Britain most subject to invasion, especially from a Southern foe: we shall also find, that they furnish almost one half of the representatives in the House of Commons, although their area does not amount to one fifth of the whole island. Reasoning, therefore, on principles of analogy, we should infer, that the lines of an entrenchment, or fortification, most exposed to attack, should have additional strength, population, and guards. Indeed nature has, in many respects, endowed the Southern

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segment of our island with superlative pre-eminence. But except along the intersecting line of London, Bath, and Bristol, there are no other large cities throughout the whole Southern base of Great Britain. Our great manufacturing towns and cities have been gradually migrating more to the centre and north of England ; and one half of our parliamentary boroughs have been suffered to fall into decay.

It seems never to have occurred to our political orators and writers, in their discussions and proposals for a reform of parliamentary representation, to combine and contrast such propositions with the invasion, defence, and strength of the kingdom. For instance, when we take a geographical survey of Britain, as connected with the means of defence, and with parliamentary representation, it will appear wisdom or instinct in our forefathers, that the parts most exposed to invasion should be fortified with additional popula-

population, and a stronger frontier. This, amongst others, I conceive was one reason why political privileges and prerogatives were dealt out to the inhabitants of the channel coast, and why parliamentary boroughs were multiplied in the Southern and most vulnerable parts of our island.

The propositions for a parliamentary reformation, which have been offered by men of transcendent abilities, the principles of which are, an increase in the number of representatives, and the amputation or purchase of the decayed and rotten boroughs, are both liable to weighty objections; and the articles of union with Scotland would increase this embarrassment. I think it is a dubious proposition, whether the parliamentary representation should bear an exact proportion to the geographical dimensions or area of the country; whether parliamentary representation should travel after the population; or *vice versa*, whether the latter should

should not be directed and guided to accompany the representation, and to be made subservient to the political organization and skeleton of the constitution, which time has rendered venerable.

For example, would it not be more beneficial to the joint security of the constitution, and of the kingdom, to strengthen the channel frontier, and principal feat of the decayed boroughs, by one or two million of additional inhabitants? Holland is one proof how population may be compelled to follow a wise legislation, even against all the disadvantages of nature and situation. Decayed boroughs may be stocked like pastures, or engrafted like old trees, and rendered again vigorous and prolific. Would there be more difficulty, or less prudence and œconomy in concentrating the strength of Great Britain, by such domestic colonization, than in founding empires, and squandering millions across the Atlantic? Are there not disbanded officers,

cers, sailors, and soldiers? Some more encouragement should be dealt out to these defenders of their country. Sweden provides her soldiers with lands and houses; a policy far more beneficial and less expensive than our invalid hospitals. Are there not fisheries and manufacturies to encourage the necessitous and industrious? Are there not an exuberance of parochial and poor children in our overgrown and gorged metropolis, who might be maintained at less expence, and with more utility to the nation, were they dispersed throughout the counties and boroughs which skirt the channel?

I am persuaded that the proprietors of decayed boroughs, together with the legislature, and the nation, would be equally interested and benefited in adopting a mild remedy for parliamentary reformation; that is, by colonizing all decayed boroughs with additional houses and inhabitants. Alexander the Great, during the career of war, and whilst he was adding immense

mense empires to the Macedonian, built many magnificent cities. By the simple method here suggested, the representation of our most opprobrious boroughs might soon be recruited to a decent and respectable standard. The House of Commons should beware of persevering against every petition, remonstrance, and satire, to degrade themselves in the public estimation. It is for their own interest and credit, and indeed essential to the future stability of the constitution, that one third of the popular elections should not be considered as a burlesque on representation, and that they should not be made a subject of ridicule throughout Europe. If they reject the projects of political re-edification, they cannot deny the propriety and necessity of political repair. It is obvious, that by acting thus, they will likewise add to the strength, defence, and security of the island, where it is most vulnerable, and most exposed.

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A Political and Military survey of *Ireland*, as connected with its invasion and defence, is recommended to those who have more leisure, and better opportunities of information than the Editor of the present work. Why do not the Irish legislature attend more to agriculture, to the culture of hemp, of oak, and other useful timber; to fisheries, harbours, and to the emigration and seduction of their inhabitants to the wildernesses of North America? They should give encouragement to the employment of oxen in agriculture: their hides, tallow, and flesh, will amply repay the national bounties. It would be happy for both islands if their parliaments dealt less in rhetorick, and more in plans for the public prosperity, security, and happiness. A momentous epoch seems nearly approaching, when they will find it necessary to expunge a considerable portion of their political breviary. It is now time for rational governments to pause, to look back upon the folly and misconduct of preceding ages,
and

and even from their ignorance and inexperience to derive precepts of wisdom. Alas ! amongst the heterogeneous mass of Continental powers, there would seem to be everlasting embers of political discord. But from these hostile feuds and combinations, Great Britain and Ireland might, in most instances, be as secure as if they constituted a distinct planet. Let their legislators therefore direct more of their attention at home, and endeavour to correct or alleviate the errors and abuses which more or less pervade every group, department, and rank of civil society,

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